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ARTICLE
A UNIFIED THEORY OF DATA
WILLIAM MAGNUSON*
ABSTRACT
How does the proliferation of data in our modern economy affect our legal
system? Scholars that have addressed the question have nearly universally
agreed that the dramatic increases in the amount of data available to compa-
nies, as well as the new uses to which that data is being put, raise fundamental
problems for our regulatory structures. But just what those problems might be
remains an area of deep disagreement. Some argue that the problem with data is
that current uses lead to discriminatory results that harm minority groups. Some
argue that the problem with data is that it impinges on the privacy interests of
citizens. Still others argue that the problem with data is that its remarkable
efficacy as a tool will lead to disruptions in labor markets.
This Article will argue that the disagreements about data and its harms in
modern society are the result of overly compartmentalized an alyses of the na-
ture of data itself. Data, after all, is a strikingly broad concept, one that spans
everything from where you ate breakfast today to the genetic markers in your
DNA to the returns on your 401(k) last year. By focusing narrowly on specific
segments of the data industry, both scholars and policymakers have crafted a set
of conflicting rules and recommendations that fail to address the core problem
of data itself.
This Article aims to correct this gap. First, it provides a taxonomy of the
core features of the data economy today and the various behaviors, both positive
and negative, that these features make possible. Second, the Article categorizes
the types of arguments made about costs and benefits of wider data usage. Fi-
nally, the Article argues that the only way to reconcile the varied and overlap-
ping approaches to data in our current regulatory system is to create a more
unified law of data. This unified law of data would set forth harmonized and
consistent rules for the gathering, storage, and use of data, and it would estab-
lish rules to incentivize beneficial data practices and sanction harmful ones.
Ultimately, the Article concludes, governing data will require a more compre-
hensive approach than the limited and piecemeal efforts that have ruled to date.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The data economy has arrived, and it is sending shockwaves throughout
the nation. Large technology companies like Facebook, Google, Apple, and
Amazon have emerged as massive repositories of personal data, collecting
information about everything from who our friends are, to where we go, to
what we buy.1 Financial institutions are using data to improve their invest-
ment decisions and allocate capital.2 Health care companies are aggressively
seeking out data in order to study disease and create medicines.3 “Data ag-
1 See Jack Nicas et al., How Each Big Tech Company May Be Targeted by Regulators,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/08/technology/antitrust-ama-
zon-apple-facebook-google.html [https://perma.cc/W28E-8C2H]; Jennifer Valentino-DeVries
et al., Your Apps Know Where You Were Last Night, and They’re Not Keeping It Secret, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/12/10/business/location-
data-privacy-apps.html [https://perma.cc/J44M-Z3D5]; Stuart A. Thompson & Charlie
Warzel, Twelve Million Phones, One Dataset, Zero Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/12/19/opinion/location-tracking-cell-phone.html
[https://perma.cc/TZ3Y-Z2F4]; Sam Schechner & Mark Secada, You Give Apps Sensitive Per-
sonal Information. Then They Tell Facebook, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 22, 2019), https://www.
wsj.com/articles/you-give-apps-sensitive-personal-information-then-they-tell-facebook-
11550851636 [https://perma.cc/SVR3-SJS8]; Geoffrey A. Fowler, I Found Your Data. It’s For
Sale, WASH. POST (July 18, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/07/18/i-
found-your-data-its-sale/ [https://perma.cc/9EWF-RASL]; Carly Minsky, Is Consumer Pro-
tection Legislation Fit for Purpose?, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/
3901dd14-ca55-11e9-af46-b09e8bfe60c0 [https://perma.cc/T4AJ-3BYH].
2 See The Fintech Revolution, ECONOMIST (May 9, 2015), https://www.economist.com/
leaders/2015/05/09/the-fintech-revolution [https://perma.cc/SK3R-8MZL]; Nathaniel Popper,
Where Finance and Technology Come Together, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.ny
times.com/2016/11/15/business/dealbook/where-finance-and-technology-come-together.html
[https://perma.cc/MMS5-NVQS]; Machine Learning Promises to Shake Up Large Swathes of
Finance, ECONOMIST (May 25, 2017), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/
2017/05/25/machine-learning-promises-to-shake-up-large-swathes-of-finance [https://perma.
cc/3ESL-QXFR] [hereinafter Machine Learning in Finance].
3 See Data and Medicine: A Revolution in Health Care Is Coming, ECONOMIST (Feb. 1,
2018), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2018/02/01/a-revolution-in-health-care-is-coming
[https://perma.cc/HB6B-JW87]; Jason Millman, What Big Data Could Do for Health Care,
WASH. POST (July 9, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/07/09/
what-big-data-could-do-for-health-care/ [https://perma.cc/4ZTG-KXBX]; Madhumita Murgia
& Max Harlow, How Top Health Websites Are Sharing Sensitive Data with Advertisers, FIN.
TIMES (Nov. 12, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/0fbf4d8e-022b-11ea-be59-e49b2a136b8d
[https://perma.cc/8QK7-LWJG].
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gregators,” whose sole raison d’être is to collect and monetize data, have
emerged as major players across industry sectors.4
The rise of the data economy has generated fierce controversy, includ-
ing a fair deal of hand-wringing from participants in the industry itself. Tim
Cook, the CEO of Apple, has stated that “stockpiles of personal data serve
only to enrich the companies that collect them” and has called for a federal
data law that minimizes the collection of personal data.5 Mark Zuckerberg,
the founder of Facebook, has similarly called for “robust conversations”
about the relationship between social media platforms and data.6 Congress,
for its part, has held hearings and launched investigations into the data prac-
tices of technology companies.7 The state of California has gone further, in
2018 enacting the wide-ranging California Consumer Privacy Act
(“CCPA”) aimed at enhancing privacy protections for consumer data.8
The scholarship on data and its discontents has accelerated as well.
Scholars have argued that the data economy will lead to systematic discrimi-
nation against minorities.9 They have argued that it will lead to major intru-
4 See Natasha Singer, Mapping, and Sharing, the Consumer Genome, N.Y. TIMES (June
15, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/17/technology/acxiom-the-quiet-giant-of-con
sumer-database-marketing.html [https://perma.cc/NG4N-ES8R]; Nathaniel Popper, Banks and
Tech Firms Battle over Something Akin to Gold: Your Data, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2017), https:
//www.nytimes.com/2017/03/23/business/dealbook/banks-and-tech-firms-battle-over-some
thing-akin-to-gold-your-data.html [https://perma.cc/PT9U-2TE5]; Crunching the Numbers,
ECONOMIST (May 19, 2012), https://www.economist.com/special-report/2012/05/19/crunch
ing-the-numbers [https://perma.cc/AJ8N-QJ5N]; Ryan Tracy, Lawmakers Call for Investiga-
tion of Fintech Firm Yodlee’s Data Selling, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 17, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/lawmakers-call-for-investigation-of-fintech-firm-yodlees-data-selling-11579269600?
st=ii27zllwxudumfm [https://perma.cc/BW5P-MVHQ]; For AI, Data Are Harder to Come By
than You Think, ECONOMIST (June 11, 2020), https://www.economist.com/technology-quarterly
/2020/06/11/for-ai-data-are-harder-to-come-by-than-you-think [https://perma.cc/73LG-
T2Y7].
5 See Sara Salinas & Sam Meredith, Tim Cook: Personal Data Collection Is Being
“Weaponized Against Us with Military Efficiency,” CNBC (Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.
cnbc.com/2018/10/24/apples-tim-cook-warns-silicon-valley-it-would-be-destructive-to-block-
strong-privacy-laws.html [https://perma.cc/ZK27-UE33].
6 See Jeff Horwitz & Deepa Seetharaman, Facebook’s Zuckerberg Backs Privacy Legisla-
tion, WALL ST. J. (June 26, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebooks-zuckerberg-backs-
privacy-legislation-11561589798 [https://perma.cc/W4Q2-27H3].
7 See John D. McKinnon, Big Tech Companies to Appear Before Senate to Discuss Pri-
vacy, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/big-tech-companies-to-ap
pear-before-senate-to-discuss-privacy-1536750001 [https://perma.cc/334F-2CR8]; David Mc-
Cabe, Lawmakers Urge Aggressive Action from Regulators on Big Tech, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/17/technology/senate-antitrust-tech-hearing.html
[https://perma.cc/3QQE-6E3H].
8 See California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (“CCPA”), CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100-
1798.198 (West 2020); see also Natasha Singer, What Does California’s New Data Privacy
Law Mean? Nobody Agrees, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/
29/technology/california-privacy-law.html [https://perma.cc/5RAP-KV5R].
9 See Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L.
REV. 671, 673–77 (2016); Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218, 2224–25
(2019) (arguing that the use by police, prosecutors, and judges of algorithmic risk assessments
leads to racial inequality, not because of input data or code, but because of the nature of
prediction itself); Matthew Adam Bruckner, The Promise and Perils of Algorithmic Lenders’
Use of Big Data, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 27–28 (2018) (arguing that the use of big data and
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sions into the privacy of citizens.10 They have argued that it will destabilize
our markets and concentrate power in the hands of a few giant companies.11
This literature raises serious questions about the harmful effects of the new
data economy on important societal values.
On the other hand, accompanying these dire predictions about data’s
harms is a separate, and seemingly irreconcilable, perception that data can
provide solutions to society’s most pressing problems. Here are just a few
examples of recent entries in this category. In March 2020, in an effort to
stem the spread of coronavirus within the country, South Korea launched a
massive data collection platform to track the location and activities of its
citizens, and this granular data was widely regarded as having allowed the
country’s response to be so effective.12 In May 2020, a group of college
admissions experts penned an article in the Wall Street Journal arguing that
“data-rich, comprehensive information on high schools based on their socio-
economic status and academic profile” might fill a gap in college admissions
decisions in the wake of SAT cancellations during the coronavirus pan-
demic.13 In May 2020, the city of Austin, Texas released a report on commu-
nity policing calling for more and better data to be generated in order for the
police department to improve its policing strategies.14
machine learning in credit decisions could exacerbate financial services discrimination);
Anupam Chander, The Racist Algorithm?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1023, 1025 (2017) (arguing that
the possibility of racist or sexist algorithms, based on facts that are suffused with discrimina-
tion, calls for algorithmic affirmative action, in which algorithms are designed to take into
account race and gender); Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV.
633, 633 (2017) (arguing that algorithmic decision-making could lead to “incorrect, unjusti-
fied, or unfair results” that cannot be solved through transparency alone); Sonia K. Katyal,
Private Accountability in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 66 UCLA L. REV. 54, 105–06
(2019) (arguing that artificial intelligence presents a variety of civil rights problems that must
be addressed, not just by governments, but also by corporations); Talia B. Gillis & Jann L.
Spiess, Big Data and Discrimination, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 459, 459 (2019) (arguing that algo-
rithms that extract information from big data could exacerbate discrimination and impede the
application of anti-discrimination laws).
10 See Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private Govern-
ance, and New School Speech Regulation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1149, 1184 (2018) (arguing
that governments have legitimate interests in imposing rules on how information fiduciaries
collect, use, and distribute user data).
11 Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 1041 (2014)
(arguing that technology companies can use data to manipulate consumers in pernicious ways,
including uncovering and triggering consumer frailties); Cynthia Estlund, What Should We Do
After Work? Automation and Employment Law, 128 YALE L.J. 254, 267–70 (2018) (arguing
that advances in robotics and artificial intelligence enable firms to circumvent labor rules
aimed at protecting workers).
12 See Eun A Jo, South Korea’s Experiment in Pandemic Surveillance, DIPLOMAT (Apr. 13,
2020), https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/south-koreas-experiment-in-pandemic-surveillance/
[https://perma.cc/X294-F3TJ].
13 Brennan Barnard et al., Will the Pandemic Revolutionize College Admissions?, WALL
ST. J. (May 29, 2020), https://wsj.com/articles/will-the-pandemic-revolutionize-college-admis
sions-11590763879 [https://perma.cc/C3QF-P5ME].
14 See Kelsey Bradshaw, Audit: Austin Police Need More Time, Better Data in Community
Policing, AUSTIN-AMERICAN STATESMAN (May 27, 2020), https://www.statesman.com/news/
20200527/audit-austin-police-need-more-time-better-data-in-community-policing [https://
perma.cc/FJ6F-YR9M].
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These conflicting narratives are driven not just by different values, but
also by different focuses. It is only natural that if we ask what the primary
threats to privacy are today, we will find that data ranks high on the list. It is
similarly natural that if we ask how to develop a vaccine for a deadly virus
as quickly as possible, data will also rank high on the list. But these conflict-
ing narratives can also cause real harm. When we focus on one feature of
data without also focusing on other features, we risk creating legal structures
that overweight some values at the expense of others. Just as worryingly, we
may create overlapping or inconsistent regulations that either benefit no one
or favor powerful political constituencies.
This Article attempts to remedy this gap by providing a unified theory
of data. It begins, in Part II, by describing what makes data today different
from data in the past. It argues that three key features of data in the modern
world have enabled the emergence of the data economy. First, there is sim-
ply more data than ever before. The sheer magnitude of the data that is being
produced on a daily basis dwarfs any previous period and continues to accel-
erate as mobile phones, computers, and other internet-connected gadgets
proliferate. Second, data today lasts longer than ever. The permanence of
data—that is, its ability to be stored for long periods—has been driven both
by increased capacity and by increased interest. Third, data is more easily
accessed than ever. The portability of data has allowed markets to develop
for the production, sale, and analysis of datasets, as well as an explosion in
theft and hacking.
Part III turns to the question of consequences: how should we assess
this new data ecosystem? In recent years, controversies have emerged over a
wide range of issues, on everything from data privacy to data discrimination
to data manipulation. It is easy to forget that these issues are all related to the
same thing: the magnitude, permanence, and portability of data. And, just as
importantly, they all tend to revolve around three core axes. The first axis
addresses how the spread of data in the modern world will affect the fairness
of our societal institutions. Will it impinge on fundamental values like equal-
ity, dignity, and freedom, or will it, instead, preserve or enhance them? The
second axis turns on how data will affect the efficiency of our decisions.
Will companies and governments use data to exploit or oppress their con-
sumers and citizens, or will they instead use it to empower or inform them?
The third axis addresses how data will affect the stability of our broader
systems. Will hackers undermine our democratic elections and threaten our
markets, or will governments harness data to become more responsive to
citizen preference and stabilize our financial institutions? In sum, a review
of the literature on data reveals a remarkably symmetric quality, with every
risk having an equal and opposite opportunity.
Having identified the dichotomies that typify the scholarly literature on
data, Part IV next considers whether there are unifying legal principles that
can simultaneously address both the concerns and the opportunities of data.
It answers this question in the affirmative. Specifically, it argues that a uni-
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fied law of data could help harmonize the patchwork of varied and conflict-
ing data regulations currently existing in the United States and also
encourage better data practices across industries. This unified law of data
would be animated by three core principles. First, consumers must have
clear rights of ownership over the data they generate, allowing them both to
hide and to share their data as they see fit. Second, governments must have
the right to access data for legitimate purposes, giving them a type of emi-
nent domain power over necessary data. Third, data possessors must protect
their data with adequate cybersecurity measures, paired with speedy and ef-
fective mechanisms for liability in the event of breaches. Together, these
principles of a unified law of data would go a long way towards ensuring a
fairer, safer, and more efficient data economy.
II. THE NATURE OF DATA
Data, at its heart, is simply information.15  Information about people,
relationships, transactions, and many, many other things. As such, there is an
element of data that is timeless and unchanged. We have always had infor-
mation, and we have always sought to use it. But there are elements of data
today that are truly unique, if not in category, then at least in degree. These
new elements of data have paved the way for new uses and strategies that
would have been difficult or impossible in the past. In order to understand
the controversies and conflicts that surround data today, then, we must be
careful in distinguishing the unique, new features of data from the unorigi-
nal, old features of it. It may well be true that companies are using data in
ways that discriminate against certain groups, but they have also used other
information to discriminate as well.16 It may well be true that governments
have impinged on important privacy rights by processing data, but they have
also historically violated privacy rights using many other types of informa-
tion.17 It may well be true that data-driven investment algorithms could
destabilize financial markets, but many other kinds of information have de-
stabilized markets as well.18 Thus, the question is not whether data raises
legal problems—it certainly does. The question is whether data raises legal
problems that are different in kind from those that existed before. In order to
15 1 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) (“An item of (chiefly numerical) infor-
mation, esp. one obtained by scientific work, a number of which are typically collected to-
gether for reference, analysis, or calculation.”).
16 See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 296–97 (1964) (concerning a restau-
rant in Birmingham, Alabama that refused to serve African-Americans in its dining
accommodations).
17 See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 644–45 (1961) (concerning police officers that
arrested the defendant for possession of pornographic materials after forcing open the door to
her house without a search warrant).
18 See generally JOHN CARSWELL, THE SOUTH SEA BUBBLE (1960) (concerning the notori-
ous financial crisis brought on by the collapse of the South Sea Company).
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answer that question, we must first identify the aspects of data that are dif-
ferent from information more generally.
This Part will argue that the data economy is driven by three unique
features of data today—magnitude, permanence, and portability. First, the
sheer magnitude or volume of data that is being produced and recorded on a
daily basis has increased enormously. Second, the permanence of data has
increased as well, allowing data to be stored and used for longer and longer
periods of time. And third, the portability of data has risen, with data now
easily accessible and transferable around the globe at the click of a button. In
combination, these three features of data—magnitude, permanence, and
portability—have paved the way for entirely new uses for data. These new
uses, in turn, raise new risks.
A. Magnitude
Never before has data been produced and stored at such a remarkable
rate.19 Between 2010 and 2018, the amount of data generated in the United
States increased at an annual rate of 31.9 percent.20 In China, it increased at a
rate of 41.9 percent a year.21 It is estimated that between 2020 and 2021, the
world will produce around ninety zettabytes of data, more than all the data
that has been produced since the creation of the computer.22 Accompanying
this rapid acceleration in data production is a concomitant acceleration in
storage capacity.23 In 2015, data centers stored 171 exabytes of data world-
wide.24 In 2020, they stored 985 exabytes of data.25 Another measure of ag-
gregate data storage—the amount of electricity that data centers consume—
shows the enormous amount of resources devoted to data: a recent study
found that the world’s data centers consume around 30 billion watts of elec-
tricity, the same amount as 30 nuclear power plants.26 Google’s data centers
alone use 300 million watts of electricity;27 Facebook’s use 60 million.28 To
19 See Jeff Desjardins, How Much Data Is Generated Each Day?, WORLD ECONOMIC FO-
RUM (Apr. 17, 2019), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/04/how-much-data-is-generated-
each-day-cf4bddf29f/ [https://perma.cc/HQX4-KKKN].
20 See Ludwig Siegele, A Deluge of Data Is Giving Rise to a New Economy, ECONOMIST




23 See Angus Loten, Data Center Market Powers Up to Meet Cloud Demand, WALL ST. J.
(Aug. 27, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/data-center-market-powers-up-to-meet-cloud-
demand-11566898200 [https://perma.cc/8XBS-ZF7K].
24 Arne Holst, Amount of Data Actually Stored in Data Centers Worldwide from 2015 to
2021, STATISTA (Mar. 2, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/638613/worldwide-data-
center-storage-used-capacity/ [https://perma.cc/QCM3-Q9E7].
25 Id.
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put this in perspective, in 2015, Google’s electricity use was roughly equal to
that of the entire city of San Francisco.29
The rise in data production and storage has been driven by several re-
lated features of modern life. First, the increase in mobile phone usage has
meant that people bring computing power with them wherever they go, gen-
erating new information about themselves and their activities that can then
be stored and shared by other companies.30 In 2011, 35 percent of U.S.
adults owned a smartphone.31 In 2019, 81 percent did.32 And of course, every
time an individual engages in activity on a computer, data is generated,
which can then be stored either locally or, increasingly, in the cloud.33 Often,
data is collected even without user input.34 Telephone companies,35 mapping
apps,36 and social media companies37 all have the capacity to track
smartphone location data even when users are not actively interacting with
their phones. These companies can use this data to generate remarkably intri-
cate portraits of an individual’s day-to-day routines. Facebook, for example,
has 1.4 billion daily users, who spend, on average, an hour per day on the
service.38 And it is not just smartphones that gather data about individuals
and their activities. Today, a growing array of gadgets, from smart appli-
ances to security cameras to self-driving cars, collect and store data about
28 Id.
29 See Adam Brinklow, Google Consumes as Much Electricity as San Francisco, CURBED
(Dec. 7, 2016), https://sf.curbed.com/2016/12/7/13875996/google-san-francisco-electricity-
power [https://perma.cc/5FTF-P7NF].
30 See Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 87, 94 (2016); Jane E.
Brody, Hooked on Our Smartphones, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/01/09/well/live/hooked-on-our-smartphones.html [https://perma.cc/C8TU-8PPR].
31 See Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 12, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/
internet/fact-sheet/mobile/ [https://perma.cc/958T-XJ6D].
32 Id.
33 See Ross Douthat, Your Smartphone Is Watching You, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2013), https:/
/www.nytimes.com/2013/06/09/opinion/sunday/douthat-your-smartphone-is-watching-
you.html [https://perma.cc/47RM-Q2CS].
34 See Jennifer Valentino-DeVries et al., Your Apps Know Where You Were Last Night, and
They’re Not Keeping It Secret, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interac
tive/2018/12/10/business/location-data-privacy-apps.html [https://perma.cc/J44M-Z3D5].
35 See Ephrat Livni, Your Cellphone Location Data Is Now the Last Vestige of Your Pri-
vacy, QUARTZ (June 22, 2018), https://qz.com/1312339/this-supreme-court-ruling-means-
cellphone-location-data-is-now-the-last-vestige-of-your-privacy/ [https://perma.cc/2BDX-
8MKM].
36 See Andrew Griffin, Google Stores Location Data “Even When Users Have Told It Not
To,” INDEPENDENT (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/
google-location-data-privacy-android-sundar-pichai-a8490636.html [https://perma.cc/8ET6-
ZE5L].
37 See Tony Romm et al., U.S. Government, Tech Industry Discussing Ways to Use
Smartphone Location Data to Combat Coronavirus, WASH. POST (Mar. 17, 2020), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/03/17/white-house-location-data-coronavirus/
[https://perma.cc/PRJ9-7H3Z].
38 See Eduardo Porter, Your Data Is Crucial to a Robotic Age. Shouldn’t You Be Paid for
It?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/06/business/economy/user-
data-pay.html [https://perma.cc/XY23-V4Y5].
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their environments.39 These gadgets, too, create massive amounts of data.
Self-driving cars are estimated to produce around 100 gigabytes of data per
second.40 Together, these developments, bringing computing power into rap-
idly expanding corners of our lives, mean that an ever-greater portion of our
lives is being recorded and stored in the form of computer data.
Second, and relatedly, rapid increases in computing power have ena-
bled all this new data to be processed and stored. The well-known Moore’s
Law, which posits that the number of components per integrated circuit,
roughly equivalent to a computer’s processing power, will double every
eighteen to twenty-four months, held true for decades and contributed to
rapidly accelerating computational capacity every year.41 While Moore’s
Law may have lost some of its predictive power in recent years, the collec-
tive increase in the power of computing to date has already been enough to
transform our very conception of what a computer can do.42 The ability of
computers to process more data has opened pathways to new techniques in
computer science, such as machine learning and neural networks, that have
made major breakthroughs by processing massive amounts of data and de-
tecting patterns in it.43 In 2011, for example, IBM’s artificial intelligence-
based Watson program beat the world’s best Jeopardy! contestants by a size-
able margin.44 In 2017, a machine learning-based program known as Al-
phaGo beat the world’s best Go player.45 Commercial applications have
shown promise as well, notching remarkable achievements in health care,46
image recognition,47 and fraud detection.48 Optimism about the potential of
39 See Stacy-Ann Elvy, Commodifying Consumer Data in the Era of the Internet of
Things, 59 B.C. L. REV. 423, 435–39 (2018).
40 See Regulating the Internet Giants: The World’s Most Valuable Resource Is No Longer
Oil, but Data, ECONOMIST (May 6, 2017), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/05/06/the-
worlds-most-valuable-resource-is-no-longer-oil-but-data [https://perma.cc/DEC5-2NQD].
41 See John O. McGinnis, Accelerating AI, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 366, 370 (2010).
42 See Shara Tibken, CES 2019: Moore’s Law Is Dead, Says Nvidia’s CEO, CNET (Jan. 9,
2019), https://www.cnet.com/news/moores-law-is-dead-nvidias-ceo-jensen-huang-says-at-ces-
2019/ [https://perma.cc/4FCA-V6MW].
43 See William Magnuson, Artificial Financial Intelligence, 9 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 337,
339–49 (2020).
44 See STEPHEN BAKER, FINAL JEOPARDY: THE STORY OF WATSON, THE COMPUTER THAT
WILL TRANSFORM OUR WORLD 251 (2012).
45 See Larry Greenemeier, AI versus AI: Self-Taught AlphaGo Zero Vanquishes Its Prede-
cessor, SCIENTIFIC AM. (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/ai-versus-
ai-self-taught-alphago-zero-vanquishes-its-predecessor/ [https://perma.cc/DMK4-8UTS].
46 See Emma Hinchliffe, IBM’s Watson Supercomputer Discovers 5 New Genes Linked to
ALS, MASHABLE (Dec. 14, 2016), http://mashable.com/2016/12/14/ibm-watson-als-research/
#oKfRVPG3C8qI [https://perma.cc/4RY3-QXR6].
47 See, e.g., Large Scale Visual Recognition Challenge 2017 (ILSVRC2017), IMAGENET
(2017), http://image-net.org/challenges/LSVRC/2017/ [https://perma.cc/3X7R-ZMP5].
48 See Daniel Chatfield, Fighting Fraud with Machine Learning, MONZO (Feb. 3, 2017),
https://monzo.com/blog/2017/02/03/fighting-fraud-with-machine-learning/ [https://perma.cc/
HV64-RBB8]; Machine Learning in Finance, supra note 2. R
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artificial intelligence and other big data techniques has, in turn, generated
new demands for data, in a kind of data-focused feedback loop.49
Finally, as companies have increasingly come to understand and appre-
ciate the value of data, new producers of data have emerged to respond to
the demand for it. One aspect of this new source of data production is the
rise of “data brokers” or “data aggregators,” corporate producers of data
that specialize in monetizing data.50 Take, for example, Acxiom, a data bro-
ker in the advertising space. Acxiom’s business is based on collecting data
about consumer behavior and then selling it to clients in order to improve
their advertising results.51 The information it possesses about individuals is
enormous—as early as 2012, its database stored information on 500 million
active consumers, with around 1,500 data points per consumer.52 Data bro-
kers like Acxiom have become a major economic force in recent years. One
study found that the data brokerage industry generates around $200 billion
of revenue a year.53 Acxiom itself sold its marketing business for $2.3 billion
in 2018.54 But it is not just specialized data brokers that are responding to the
demand for more data. Another aspect of the supply side of data is internal
to companies themselves. Recognizing that many features of business today
require large amounts of data, companies are increasingly employing (di-
rectly or indirectly) their own workers to produce the data. Scale AI, a start-
up focusing on machine-learning applications for everything from drones to
self-driving cars to robots, has more than 30,000 workers entirely devoted to
“tagging,” or labeling, images from things like self-driving cars in order to
improve the company’s software’s ability to identify objects in the real
world.55 Another company, iMerit, employs more than 2,000 workers around
49 See WILL MARKOW ET AL., IBM, THE QUANT CRUNCH: HOW THE DEMAND FOR DATA
SCIENCE SKILLS IS DISRUPTING THE JOB MARKET 3–4 (2017), https://www.ibm.com/
downloads/cas/3RL3VXGA [https://perma.cc/S92C-6AJN].
50 See Amy J. Schmitz, Secret Consumer Scores and Segmentations Separating “Haves”
from “Have-Nots,” 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1411, 1419–25 (describing the emergence of the
data broker industry); Daniel J. Solove & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, A Model Regime of Privacy
Protection, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 357, 364–68 (highlighting the unregulated nature of data
brokers).




52 See Singer, supra note 4. R
53 See David A. Hoffman, Intel Executive: Rein in Data Brokers, N.Y. TIMES (July 15,
2019), http://nyti.ms/2XLaDO2 [https://perma.cc/97VP-LFD5].
54 See Alexandra Bruell & Suzanne Vranica, IPG to Acquire Acxiom Division for $2.3
Billion, WALL ST. J. (July 2, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ipg-in-advanced-talks-to-ac
quire-acxiom-division-for-over-2-2-billion-1530561951?st=xndus119srg84vn [https://
perma.cc/DY6X-P65N].
55 See Lucas Matney, Scale AI and its 22-Year-Old CEO Lock Down $100 Million to
Label Silicon Valley’s Data, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 5, 2019), https://techcrunch.com/2019/08/05/
scale-ai-and-its-22-year-old-ceo-lock-down-100-million-to-help-label-silicon-valleys-data/
[https://perma.cc/D3BN-FNWD]; Are Data More Like Oil or Sunlight?, ECONOMIST (Feb. 20,
2020), https://www.economist.com/special-report/2020/02/20/are-data-more-like-oil-or-sun
light [https://perma.cc/K5YM-WXLF].
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the world to help Amazon create its online data-labeling service.56 Invest-
ment banks, too, have gotten in on the act, hiring machine learning scholars
from academia to develop their own data-intensive applications in finance.57
Put together, these developments have contributed to a massive rise in the
creation and propagation of data, covering everything from the highly per-
sonal (such as where people are located and what they are doing) to the
highly impersonal (such as images of objects and financial results).58
The magnitude and volume of data being created and stored in digital
form today, driven by mobile phones, the internet, and processing power,
have meant that there is more data potentially available to individuals, com-
panies, and governments than ever before. This does not, of course, mean
that data is freely available. Indeed, one of the major concerns of the new
data economy is that data is a resource that can be weaponized for commer-
cial advantage.59 Large companies might refrain from sharing their data with
others, as they can use it to develop their competitive strategies.60 Govern-
ments might refrain from sharing data with the public out of a concern that
doing so would harm their criminal enforcement priorities or their efforts to
fight tax fraud.61 So even if there is more data than ever before, the land-
scape of the data economy is also fragmented and siloed in important ways.
B. Permanence
Data today is not just more prolific than it has ever been. It is also more
permanent.62 Once data has been created, it is increasingly stored and acces-
56 See Cade Metz, A.I. Is Learning from Humans. Many Humans, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/16/technology/ai-humans.html [https://perma.cc/
WC7H-43KD].
57 See Sarah Butcher, The Top Machine Learning Teams in Investment Banks, EFINANCIAL
CAREERS (May 23, 2018), https://news.efinancialcareers.com/uk-en/315969/top-machine-
learning-teams-banks [https://perma.cc/L85P-3HMS].
58 On the dangers of even anonymized and de-personalized datasets, see Paul Ohm, Bro-
ken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L.
REV. 1701, 1703–06, 1716–22 (2010); Jane Yakowitz, Tragedy of the Data Commons, 25
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 3–5 (2011).
59 See Cesare Fracassi & William Magnuson, Data Autonomy, 74 VAND. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2021).
60 See id.
61 See Sarah Brayne, The Criminal Law and Law Enforcement Implications of Big Data,
14 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 293, 305 (2018).
62 See VIKTOR MAYER-SCHONBERGER, DELETE: THE VIRTUE OF FORGETTING IN THE DIGI-
TAL AGE 6–7 (2011); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND
PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET 33 (2007); JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET
AND HOW TO STOP IT 229 (2008); Jean-François Blanchette & Deborah G. Johnson, Data
Retention and the Panoptic Society: The Social Benefits of Forgetfulness, 18 INFO. SOC’Y 33
(1998); H. Brian Holland, Inherently Dangerous: The Potential for an Internet-Specific Stan-
dard Restricting Speech that Performs a Teaching Function, 39 U. S.F. L. REV. 353, 403–04
(2005); Michael L. Rustad & Sanna Kulevska, Reconceptualizing the Right to be Forgotten to
Enable Transatlantic Data Flow, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 349, 352, 355 (2015); Alexander
Tsesis, The Right to Erasure: Privacy, Data Brokers, and the Indefinite Retention of Data, 49
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 433, 444–45 (2014); but see Agnieszka McPeak, Disappearing Data,
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sible for long periods of time, and potentially forever.63 Information stored in
digital form is not subject to fading memory or decaying paper.64 It is perma-
nent in a way that was hardly conceivable before the dawn of the computer
age, or even just a few years ago. The life span of a CD, after all, is only five
to ten years.65 Today, with easy and affordable cloud storage, data is increas-
ingly being stored on servers owned and operated by large technology firms,
which regularly maintain and update them.66 This applies to wide ranges of
data. Company records are increasingly backed up on the cloud.67 Individu-
als back up photos and documents to cloud services.68 Social media posts
can be copied or downloaded and then shared with others.69 Police depart-
ments that download video from Ring doorbell cameras can keep the video
forever.70 Data has thus acquired a degree of permanence.
Part of the shift to permanence in the data landscape has been driven by
purely technological change. Companies and individuals now have much of
their information stored on computers and servers, and the rise of cloud stor-
age has meant that they can store more information for longer and for
cheaper.71 Thus, they simply can store data permanently. Another part of the
2018 WIS. L. REV. 17, 19 (discussing the spread of “ephemeral” data platforms like Snapchat
where data is deleted after a brief period of time).
63 See Farhad Manjoo, Do We Want an Erasable Internet?, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 22, 2013,
4:46 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/do-we-want-an-erasable-internet-1387748729 [https:/
/perma.cc/8X9E-YF4D].
64 But see David Talbot, The Fading Memory of the State, MIT TECH. REV. (July 1, 2005),
https://www.technologyreview.com/2005/07/01/39714/the-fading-memory-of-the-state/
[https://perma.cc/P56V-V39A] (detailing the problems associated with storing data for long
periods of time in increasingly incompatible formats).
65 See Laura Sydell, How Long Do CDs Last? It Depends, But Definitely Not Forever,
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Aug. 18, 2014, 5:21 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/
2014/08/18/340716269/how-long-do-cds-last-it-depends-but-definitely-not-forever [https://
perma.cc/93EL-JG73] (describing the struggle of archivists to maintain information stored on
degrading CDs).
66 See Quentin Hardy, ‘Where Does Cloud Storage Really Reside? And Is It Secure?,’
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/23/insider/where-does-cloud-
storage-really-reside-and-is-it-secure.html [https://perma.cc/G6F4-VUSV].
67 See IBM Cloud Education, Backup and Disaster Recovery, IBM CLOUD LEARN HUB
(Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.ibm.com/cloud/learn/backup-disaster-recovery [https://perma.cc/
QG2W-635W].
68 See David Pierce, Cluttered Phone and Computer? Put Your Files in the Cloud, WALL
ST. J. (Sept. 9, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/cluttered-phone-and-computer-
put-your-files-in-the-cloud-1536498000 [https://perma.cc/EBZ5-D7RZ]; Tim Bradshaw,
Dropbox Faces Growing Competition in Cloud Storage Wars, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2013),
https://www.ft.com/content/88be965e-edd8-11e2-816e-00144feabdc0 [https://perma.cc/
W59H-HMZW].
69 See Thomas H. Koenig & Michael L. Rustad, Digital Scarlet Letters: Social Media
Stigmatization of the Poor and What Can Be Done, 93 NEB. L. REV. 592, 609 (2015).
70 See Drew Harwell, Police Can Keep Ring Camera Video Forever and Share with




71 For an example of one downside of all this cheap storage, see David E. Sanger, et al.,
Attack Gave Chinese Hackers Privileged Access to U.S. Systems, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2015),
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shift has been driven by incentives. As it has become increasingly clear that
data has substantial value to businesses, governments, and researchers, ac-
tors have recognized the incentives to collect troves of data for future use.72
Thus, they also desire to store data permanently. But yet another part of the
increasing permanence of data is due to the fact that data is now often stored
in many different places at once. It is not just that individuals are storing
more data on secure cloud servers, or that companies are collecting more
data on consumer behavior, or that social media sites maintain vast records
of individual actions and photos and messages. It is that, increasingly, the
same data is stored in many different places by many different actors.73 A
post on Twitter might, for example, be tweeted out by an individual. It might
then be retweeted by others. Still others might take a screenshot of it and
share it on Facebook. Google might store a cached version of the post on its
servers. Yet another version might be stored on archived web pages stored
by the Wayback Machine (a site that preserves copies of defunct webpages).
If it was a particularly popular tweet, it might even be written about in a
newspaper or blog.74 This means that, long after the post has been deleted
(either intentionally or unintentionally) by the original writer, copies of it
will still exist and potentially be widely available. Data, once created, has
become surprisingly durable—it is hard for it to simply be erased or
forgotten.
In many ways, the permanence of data is a welcome development. It is
convenient for individuals to store treasured memories and old emails on
cloud servers that ensure they will always be able to retrieve it. It is helpful
to researchers when they can access data on health outcomes, or demo-
graphic trends, or financial results. Some scholars have argued that data
should be made more permanent, at least when it comes to government data.
These scholars argue that where governments possess data that the public
has a right to access, they should make the data available on the internet with
a permanent address so that researchers and others can view and analyze the
data in the future.75 Doing so would make government decision-making
more transparent and open opportunities for “innovation and dynamism” by




72 See Rana Foroohar, How Much Is Your Data Worth?, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2019), https://
www.ft.com/content/3f2b0f0e-57cc-11e9-91f9-b6515a54c5b1 [https://perma.cc/V82B-
TSLS].
73 See David W. Opderbeck, Cybersecurity and Executive Power, 89 WASH. U. L. REV.
795, 798 n.10 (2012) (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of data redundancy).
74 But see Jill Lepore, The Cobweb: Can the Internet Be Archived?, NEW YORKER (Jan. 19,
2015), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/01/26/cobweb [https://perma.cc/5XRU-
3N8N] (discussing the ways in which data from websites disappears).
75 See David Robinson, et al., Government Data and the Invisible Hand, 11 YALE J.L. &
TECH. 160, 167–68 (2009).
76 Id. at 161–62.
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But data permanence is also a cause of growing concern for many ob-
servers. An embarrassing video might stick around on the internet for years,
causing psychological harm to an individual long after its initial post.77 A
defamatory blog post might be easily discoverable by future employers or
family members.78 Or, more broadly, vast data on an individual’s purchase
history, website visits, and physical movement might remain on a company’s
servers indefinitely, creating myriad privacy and cybersecurity issues.79 All
of these are troubling possibilities and, all too often, have caused serious
damage.80 As Justice Benjamin Cardozo wrote in 1931, “[w]hat gives the
sting to writing is its permanence in form. The spoken word dissolves, but
the written one abides and perpetuates the scandal.”81 What was true then is
only more true today.
There are, of course, important limitations to the permanence of data.
One is simply cost. The process of backing up data is not free. Institutions
must either store the data locally on their own hard drives or pay other com-
panies to store it for them.82 Both of these can be expensive. In 2018, Austra-
lian telecom companies spent over $22 million on data retention services in
order to comply with their country’s stringent metadata storage laws.83 As
mentioned earlier, data centers require large amounts of electricity to main-
tain.84 Thus, in the absence of strong reasons to maintain data, one might
expect governments, companies, and individuals to erase data that they no
longer need. And it is certainly true that companies are constantly seeking
77 See Gabriel Snyder, One Day, All of This Will Be Embarrassing, ATLANTIC (June 11,
2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/family/archive/2019/06/sharenting-its-way-becoming-old-
fashioned/591361/ [https://perma.cc/E7YY-RRBB].
78 See Paul Sullivan, Negative Online Data Can Be Challenged, at a Price, N.Y. TIMES
(June 10, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/11/your-money/11wealth.html [https://
perma.cc/37CL-36NT].
79 See Emily Price, How to Download Your Entire Amazon Purchase History, LIFEHACKER
(Apr. 27, 2019, 1:41 PM), https://lifehacker.com/how-to-download-your-entire-amazon-
purchase-history-1834353979 [https://perma.cc/N6HL-FT4Q].
80 See Benjamin P. Edwards, Cybersecurity Oversight Liability, 35 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
663, 664 (2019).
81 Ostrowe v. Lee, 175 N.E. 505, 506 (N.Y. 1931).
82 See Information Storage: Tape Rescues Big Data, ECONOMIST (Sept. 26, 2013) https://
www.economist.com/babbage/2013/09/26/tape-rescues-big-data [https://perma.cc/CB36-
WRJL]; Richard Waters, Amazon Pushes Cloud Revolution Into Its Second Phase, FIN. TIMES
(Dec. 5, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/6699593c-1780-11ea-9ee4-11f260415385 [https://
perma.cc/KEG2-R78D].
83 See Chris Duckett, Data Retention Costs Australian Telcos Upwards of AU$210 Million
to Date, ZDNET (July 23, 2019, 7:15 AM), https://www.zdnet.com/article/data-retention-costs-
australian-telcos-upwards-of-au210-million-to-date/ [https://perma.cc/TDF2-7M4Q].
84 See Anupam Chander & Uyen P. Le, Data Nationalism, 64 EMORY L.J. 677, 723–24
(2015) (“Operating such a data center remains expensive because of enormous energy and
other expenses—averaging $950,000 in Brazil, $710,000 in Chile, and $510,000 in the United
States each month.”); Sara Castellanos, Cisco CIO Says Shift to Cloud Will Cut Energy Use,
Costs, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 15, 2019, 5:51 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/cisco-cio-says-
shift-to-cloud-will-cut-energy-use-costs-11565905879 [https://perma.cc/T5NQ-NVF6].
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ways to cut down on data retention costs.85 At the same time, the actual cost
of storing a given amount of data has dropped enormously. In 1967, a hard
drive that stored a single megabyte of data cost around $1 million.86 Today, a
gigabyte of storage capacity would cost around two cents.87 Thus, while cost
certainly is a limiting factor on how much data governments, companies, and
individuals are willing to store, the actual substantive amount of such data
that is able to be stored at reasonable prices is significantly larger than it has
ever been.
Another important limitation on the permanence of data is digital in-
compatibility.88 Sometimes referred to as “digital obsolescence” or “bit
rot,” the problem of maintaining data in readable formats over long periods
of time, when new software and hardware is invented and adopted and old
software and hardware is abandoned, is only beginning to be understood.89
Accessing stored data requires a number of interlinked parts, all of which
must function in order for the data to be maintained: data formats, software
programs, operating systems, hardware components.90 If any of these break
down, the data can be lost forever. NASA has already lost data on its first
missions to the moon after the original machines used to read the data were
discarded.91 An estimated seventy-seven percent of datasets for research pa-
pers published between 1991 and 2011 have been lost.92 In order to avoid
data loss, some experts have started recommending that data be migrated
into different formats every five to ten years in order to ensure compatibil-
ity.93 And even storing data on the cloud is not perfect. Companies providing
these services can suffer data losses or go out of business, potentially leading
to massive amounts of data being lost forever. Policy changes might lead
85 See Bob Violino, Can the Cloud Save You Money? These Companies Say Yes, IN-
FOWORLD (Oct. 21, 2019, 3:00 AM), https://www.infoworld.com/article/3445206/can-the-
cloud-save-you-money-these-companies-say-yes.html [https://perma.cc/4MFR-GZAK].
86 See Lucas Mearian, CW@50: Data Storage Goes from $1M to 2 Cents Per Gigabyte,




88 See Richard Whitt, “Through a Glass, Darkly”: Technical, Policy, and Financial Ac-
tions to Avert the Coming Digital Dark Ages, 33 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 117, 127
(2017); Digital Data: Bit Rot, ECONOMIST (Apr. 28, 2012), https://www.economist.com/lead
ers/2012/04/28/bit-rot [https://perma.cc/HS9W-274S]; Pritam Roy, All the Data We Lost to
Incompatible APIs, MEDIUM (Feb. 4, 2018), https://medium.com/swlh/a-moment-for-all-of-
our-data-lost-in-time-260a54fef86 [https://perma.cc/YSE7-23CN].
89 See Kari Kraus, When Data Disappears, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2011), https://www.ny-
times.com/2011/08/07/opinion/sunday/when-data-disappears.html [https://perma.cc/B4XX-
3XZN]; Digital Archiving: History Flushed, ECONOMIST (Apr. 28, 2012), https://www.econo
mist.com/international/2012/04/28/history-flushed [https://perma.cc/EQL7-445M].
90 See Whitt, supra note 88, at 117. R
91 See Digital Data: Bit Rot, supra note 88. R
92 See Timothy H. Vines et al., The Availability of Research Data Declines Rapidly with
Article Age, 24 CURRENT BIOLOGY 94, 95 (2014).
93 See David Pogue, Should You Worry About Data Rot?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2009),
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/26/technology/personaltech/26pogue-email.html [https://
perma.cc/8J5T-VPCR].
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cloud providers to delete data as well, even when companies and individuals
want to keep it. In 2009, for example, Amazon remotely erased copies of
George Orwell’s novels 1984 and Animal Farm from users’ Kindle e-readers
after Amazon learned that the novels had been uploaded by a company that
did not have rights to them.94 In 2019, Microsoft shut down its e-book pro-
gram and announced that it would be deleting any books that users had
bought from their libraries.95
A final limitation on data permanence comes from law. A variety of
rules and regulations in jurisdictions around the world constrain the ability
of companies to store data for long periods. The European Union’s General
Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”) famously includes a so-called “right
to be forgotten,” under which individuals may force companies to erase per-
sonal data related to them.96 California’s recently enacted CCPA similarly
gives individuals the right to request businesses to delete their personal in-
formation in certain circumstances.97 Other special rules apply to particular
industries. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (or
“HIPAA”) imposes a number of requirements on health care institutions to
properly delete data containing protected health information.98 The GDPR
goes even further, forbidding companies from retaining personal data if it is
no longer necessary for them to keep it.99
But despite these important limitations on data permanence, the basic
observation remains the same—vast amounts of data about our world, our
94 See Brad Stone, Amazon Erases Orwell Books from Kindle, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2009),
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/18/technology/companies/18amazon.html [https://
perma.cc/JFN9-5YFS].
95 See Brian Barrett, Microsoft’s Ebook Apocalypse Shows the Dark Side of DRM, WIRED
(June 30, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/microsoft-ebook-apocalypse-drm/ [https://
perma.cc/4DYE-FLJC].
96 See Commission Regulation 2016/679 of Apr. 27, 2016, General Data Protection Regu-
lation (GDPR), 2016 O.J. (L119); Robert C. Post, Data Privacy and Dignitary Privacy:
Google Spain, The Right to be Forgotten, and the Construction of the Public Sphere, 67 DUKE
L.J. 981, 986–87 (2018); Giancarlo Frosio, The Right to be Forgotten: Much Ado About Noth-
ing, 15 COLO. TECH. L.J. 307, 309 (2017).
97 Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.105 (West 2020).
98 See DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERV’S, DISPOSAL OF PROTECTED HEALTH INFORMA-
TION, https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/faq/disposal-of-protected-health-informa
tion/index.html [https://perma.cc/D5QY-QX7L].
99 See GDPR, supra note 96, at Art. 25(2) (“The controller shall implement appropriate R
technical and organisational measures for ensuring that, by default, only personal data which
are necessary for each specific purpose of the processing are processed. That obligation applies
to the amount of personal data collected, the extent of their processing, the period of their
storage and their accessibility.”); GDPR, supra note 96 at recital 39 (“The personal data R
should be adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary for the purposes for which they
are processed. This requires, in particular, ensuring that the period for which the personal data
are stored is limited to a strict minimum . . . In order to ensure that the personal data are not
kept longer than necessary, time limits should be established by the controller for erasure or
for a periodic review.”); see also Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy’s Law of Design, 9 U.C. IRVINE
L. REV. 1239, 1246 n.32 (2019); Clare Sullivan, GDPR Regulation of AI and Deep Learning in
the Context of IOT Data Processing—A Risky Strategy, 22 J. INTERNET L. 1, 11 (2018).
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thoughts, and our actions are being recorded and stored for indefinite periods
of time. How we deal with this data is thus tremendously important.
C. Portability
A final unique feature of data today is its astonishing portability. Data
can be copied, transferred, sold, accessed, moved, and viewed more easily
than ever.100 It can be emailed, downloaded, Bluetoothed, placed on digital
storage devices, saved on shared cloud drives, and moved in any number of
other convenient and instantaneous ways.101 Indeed, the entirety of an indi-
vidual’s genomic sequence could be sent over a typical email platform and
be shared with hundreds or thousands at the click of a button.102
The portability of data has been driven by many of the same phenom-
ena driving data’s magnitude and permanence. The spread of the internet, the
mass adoption of smartphones, the improvement of broadband and cell
phone networks, the increasing speed of computer chips—all of these devel-
opments have meant that data is more easily accessed and transferred, and in
larger amounts.103 Sometimes referred to as the “digital communications
revolution,” the ease and speed of data transfer today is remarkable and is
largely responsible for many of the transformative technologies of recent
years, from smartphones to videocalls to virtual assistants.104 All of these
would not have been possible without fast and reliable data transfers.105
One consequence of data portability is that data can be transformed and
repurposed in any manner of ways, by any number of parties, and for any
number of purposes.106 Take, for example, the fact that I went to the grocery
store this morning. Google Maps might use that piece of information to
make recommendations about nearby restaurants or gas stations.107 It might
also use it to estimate traffic patterns in the city and share that with other
100 See Siegele, supra note 20. R
101 See Edmund M. Hart et al., Ten Simple Rules for Digital Data Storage, 12 PLOS COM-
PUT. BIOL. 10, 10–11, 17 (2016).
102 See Scott Christley et al., Human Genomes as Email Attachments, 25 BIOINFORMATICS
274, 274 (2009).
103 See Siegele, supra note 20; Colin Jeffrey, World Record Internet Data Transfer Rate R
Almost 50,000 Times Faster Than Broadband, NEW ATLAS (Feb. 12, 2016), https://
newatlas.com/fastest-internet-data-rate-optical-ucl/41797/ [https://perma.cc/D7W9-C8G5].
104 See Mark Cooper, The Long History and Increasing Importance of Public-Service
Principles for 21st Century Public Digital Communications Networks, 12 J. TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 1, 19–20 (2014).
105 See Eric Eckel, Apple’s Siri: A Cheat Sheet, TECHREPUBLIC (June 22, 2020, 11:12 AM),
https://www.techrepublic.com/article/apples-siri-the-smart-persons-guide/ [https://perma.cc/
DT8P-C7QD].
106 See Stuart A. Thompson & Charlie Warzel, Smartphones Are Spies. Here’s Whom They
Report To., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/12/20/
opinion/location-tracking-smartphone-marketing.html [https://perma.cc/GU5D-NNP3].
107 See Frederic Lardinois, The New Google Maps with Personalized Recommendations Is
Now Live, TECHCRUNCH (June 26, 2018, 12:52 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2018/06/26/the-
new-google-maps-with-personalized-recommendations-is-now-live/ [https://perma.cc/7SAU-
TNWQ].
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Google Maps users.108 My credit card company might use the information to
learn my purchase patterns and load it into its fraud-detection software to
detect scam purchases in the future.109 If any apps on my phone share loca-
tion data with advertising companies (and many of them do), advertisers
might use that information to show me ads that are tied to my location.110 If I
use a budgeting app, the budgeting app might use the data to prepare spend-
ing reports and recommend ways to save money.111 Government health offi-
cials might use the data to detect movement patterns, assess social distancing
efforts, and prevent the spread of infectious diseases by performing contact
tracing on my precise location.112 The uses for this single piece of data are
almost limitless. They are also not constrained by the fact that I did not take
any active decision to share that data in particular (we will return to the
question of whether and when prior consent to data sharing should be con-
strued as affirmative agreement to future uses). As a result, a single payment
can be included in many different databases, and thus used to study and
analyze many different phenomena.113 This means that companies can pack-
age and repackage data into discrete datasets and sell or transfer those
datasets to others.114 Indeed, the portability of data has been an essential
driver of the Big Data revolution. Once the possibility of large-scale com-
mercial databases arose, a data ecosystem emerged to exploit it: producers of
data shared their information with data brokers, data brokers sold that infor-
mation to companies, and companies used the data to run their businesses
better.115 And once a data ecosystem emerged, data-intensive research meth-
ods, most importantly machine learning and its various iterations today, be-
came more useful.116 It is no coincidence that many of the most important
108 See Brendan Hesse, How Google Recognizes Traffic Jams in Maps, LIFEHACKER (Feb.
4, 2020, 4:30 PM) https://lifehacker.com/how-google-recognizes-traffic-jams-in-maps-
1841455880 [https://perma.cc/PD25-LP79].
109 See Randy Macaraeg, Credit Card Fraud Detection, TOWARDS DATA SCIENCE (Sept. 5,
2019), https://towardsdatascience.com/credit-card-fraud-detection-a1c7e1b75f59 [https://
perma.cc/Y544-PL95].
110 See Thompson & Warzel, supra note 1. R
111 See Fracassi & Magnuson, supra note 59. R
112 See Sara Morrison, Apple and Google Look Like Problematic Heroes in the Pandemic,
VOX (Apr. 16, 2020, 3:10 PM), https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/4/16/21221458/apple-
google-contact-tracing-app-coronavirus-covid-privacy [https://perma.cc/9KP9-LKTE].
113 See Cross-Border Credit Reporting is Becoming a Reality, ECONOMIST (Apr. 11,
2019), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2019/04/11/cross-border-credit-re
porting-is-at-last-becoming-a-reality [https://perma.cc/7YEK-EQVC].
114 See Douglas McMillan, Data Brokers Are Selling Your Secrets. How States Are Trying
to Stop Them, WASH. POST (June 24, 2019) https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/
06/24/data-brokers-are-getting-rich-by-selling-your-secrets-how-states-are-trying-stop-them/
[https://perma.cc/8A4Q-GLH8].
115 See Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for
Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 22 (2014); Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big
Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L.
REV. 93, 96–99 (2014); Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User
Control in the Age of Analytics, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 239, 253–54 (2013).
116 See Tom Young et al., Recent Trends in Deep Learning Based Natural Language
Processing No. 1708-02709, ARXIV LABS (2018), https://arxiv.org/abs/1708.02709 [https://
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breakthroughs in machine learning have occurred in the last decade or so,
precisely as the data economy was coming into existence.
But the portability of data has also raised new risks. The ease of trans-
ferring data, after all, does not just extend to consensual transfers. Hackers,
thieves, and spies can also take advantage of the portability of data for their
own purposes. Combined with data’s magnitude and permanence, the harm
from these attacks can be particularly severe and, just as problematically,
difficult to prevent. In 2020, for example, it was revealed that a flaw in
Apple’s email software for iPhones allowed hackers to send an email to re-
cipients and, without any action whatsoever from users, gain access to the
contents of their iPhones, and thereby download and copy personal data in
messages, photos, and other formats.117 If data is easily copied, it is also
easily stolen.
Data portability, of course, has important limitations. One of these is
that most companies go to great lengths to prevent their data from being
used or seen by others.118 Some of these restrictions are obvious. Companies
want to keep their trade secrets from being exposed.119 Individuals want to
ensure that the personal information they give to banks or other service
providers is not leaked to outsiders.120 Intelligence agencies want to keep
their sources and methods secret.121 To protect their data from unauthorized
use, many entities encrypt their data, or store it in offline locations.122 But
other restrictions are less obvious. One major concern in recent years has
been the difficulties that consumers face when attempting to move their data
from one company to another.123 In the financial world, consumers may face
limits on whether and how their other providers can view their banking in-
formation.124 In the social media world, consumers may face limits on how
perma.cc/R8EA-QLFF]; NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE OF ARTI-
FICIAL INTELLIGENCE (2016), at 5.
117 See Robert McMillan, Apple iPhone May Be Vulnerable to Email Hack, WALL ST. J.
(Apr. 22, 2020, 11:29 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/apple-iphone-may-be-vulnerable-to-
email-hack-11587556802 [https://perma.cc/P8RY-GYWT].
118 See Raphael Gellert, Understanding Data Protection as Risk Regulation, 18 J. IN-
TERNET L. 3, 3, 6–7 (2015).
119 See Elizabeth A. Rowe, Rats, Traps, and Trade Secrets, 57 B.C. L. REV. 381, 381
(2016); Scott J. Shackelford & Scott Russell, Above the Cloud: Enhancing Cybersecurity in
the Aerospace Sector, 10 FIU L. REV. 635, 643 (2015).
120 See Omri Ben-Shahar, Data Pollution, 11 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 104, 110 (2019); McKay
Smith & Garrett Mulrain, Equi-Failure: The National Security Implications of the Equifax
Hack and a Critical Proposal for Reform, 9 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 549, 550 (2018).
121 See Kristen E. Eichensehr, The Cyber-Law of Nations, 103 GEO. L.J. 317, 356 (2015);
Melanie J. Teplinsky, Fiddling on the Roof: Recent Developments in Cybersecurity, 2 AM. U.
BUS. L. REV. 225, 252-65 (2013).
122 See Sara Castellanos, Why Don’t Companies Just Encrypt All Their Data? It Isn’t So
Simple, WALL ST. J. (May 29, 2018, 10:05 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-dont-com
panies-just-encrypt-all-their-data-it-isnt-so-simple-1527645900?mod=rss_Technology [https:/
/perma.cc/Q6T7-Z6V5].
123 See Christopher S. Yoo, When Antitrust Met Facebook, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1147,
1154 (2012).
124 Id.
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they can download their friend groups or messages or photos.125 Sometimes,
these restrictions are driven by legitimate social reasons, such as cyber-
security or privacy.126 In others, they may be driven by more suspect ratio-
nales, such as impeding competition or reducing choice.127
Another important limitation on data portability is data transfer regula-
tion. The European Union’s GDPR includes many such rules, as does Cali-
fornia’s Consumer Privacy Act. The GDPR, for example, includes provisions
governing data transfers across borders and, in some cases, requires such
transfers to take place only after the European Union’s Commission has de-
cided that the recipient country ensures an adequate level of data protection
under its domestic laws.128 The CCPA prohibits companies from transferring
for consideration the personal data of consumers who are under sixteen years
of age unless the consumer has affirmatively authorized the transfer.129 These
types of legal restrictions on data portability prohibit companies from trans-
ferring certain types of data in certain cases, and companies expend substan-
tial resources in complying with them, as it is not always easy to separate
restricted from unrestricted data.130
But again, the limitations on data portability do not negate the fact that
most data, most of the time, is remarkably easy to transfer, and substantially
easier than in periods predating the spread of the internet and the prolifera-
tion of smartphones. The speed and ease of sharing data have thus become
an essential feature of the modern data economy.
125 See Dina Srinivasan, The Antitrust Case Against Facebook: A Monopolist’s Journey
Towards Pervasive Surveillance in Spite of Consumers’ Preference for Privacy, 16 BERKELEY
BUS. L.J. 39, 89 (2019); Jeff Horwitz, Facebook Lays Out Challenges of Letting Users Take




127 See Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 782–83 (2017);
Nathan Newman, Search, Antitrust, and the Economics of the Control of User Data, 31 YALE
J. ON REG. 401, 441–42 (2014); Competition in the Digital Age: How to Tame the Tech Titans,
ECONOMIST (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2018/01/18/how-to-tame-the-
tech-titans [https://perma.cc/B7ZQ-9PHL].
128 See Detlev Gabel & Tim Hickman, Chapter 13: Cross-Border Data Transfers – Un-
locking the EU General Data Protection Regulation, WHITE & CASE (Apr. 5, 2019), https://
www.whitecase.com/publications/article/chapter-13-cross-border-data-transfers-unlocking-eu-
general-data-protection [https://perma.cc/R8Q8-5UP5]; see generally Matthew Humerick, The
Tortoise and the Hare of International Data Privacy Law: Can the United States Catch Up to
Rising Global Standards?, 27 CATH. U. J.L. & TECH. 77 (2018).
129 See Sara H. Jodka California’s Data Privacy Law: What It Is and How to Comply (A
Step-By-Step Guide), DICKINSON WRIGHT (July 12, 2018), https://www.dickinson-wright.com/-
/media/files/news/2018/07/2californias-data-privacy-law-what-it-is-and-how-t.pdf [https://
perma.cc/SK7Q-4GZS].
130 See Nicole Lindsey, Understanding the GDPR Cost of Continuous Compliance, CPO
MAG. (May 31, 2019), https://www.cpomagazine.com/data-protection/understanding-the-gdpr-
cost-of-continuous-compliance/ [https://perma.cc/2Z9U-P57C].
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III. DATA’S DICHOTOMIES
The data economy today is driven by three unique features of data: its
magnitude, its permanence, and its portability. There is more data than ever,
and it is being produced at an ever-accelerating rate; the data that has already
been produced is, for most intents and purposes, permanent, and can be
stored for an indefinite period of time; and data can be copied, transferred,
shared, and stolen with greater ease than ever. Combined, these features
have transformed data into a resource with substantial value to individuals,
companies, governments, and researchers. But the rise of the data economy
has also generated controversy.131 Some worry that individual privacy has
been sacrificed to the insatiable demand of technology companies for data.
Others worry that data is being used to discriminate against disfavored mi-
norities. Still others worry that algorithms driven by Big Data will
destabilize our markets or distort our decisions.
This Part will argue that the controversies over data revolve around
three core axes: fairness, efficiency, and stability. While these axes overlap
and interact in various ways, they are surprisingly robust and resilient cate-
gories that show up throughout the literature on data and its discontents.
Data may lead to unfair or immoral outcomes; it may lead to inefficient or
131 See Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 60–61 (2014) (arguing that
data constitutes speech and thus should receive protection under the First Amendment); Emily
Berman, A Government of Laws and Not of Machines, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1277, 1278 (2018)
(arguing that the use of machine learning algorithms by government actors undermines the rule
of law in areas where government discretion is closely constrained by constitutional, statutory,
or regulatory rules); Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Access to Algorithms, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265,
1265 (2020) (arguing that laws granting citizens access to government records and proceedings
could reduce the threat that government algorithms present to civil rights and liberties); Dan L.
Burk, Algorithmic Fair Use, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 283, 285 (2019) (arguing that algorithmic
mediation of copyright protection and its exceptions could alter fair use standards); Cary Cog-
lianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision Making in the Machine-
Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147, 1147–48 (2017) (arguing that governmental use of machine
learning can “comfortably fit within . . . conventional legal parameters”); Ashley S. Deeks,
Predicting Enemies, 104 VA. L. REV. 1529, 1573 (2018) (arguing that the military should
clearly identify the laws and policies governing how it uses algorithms in its military opera-
tions); Lina M. Khan & David E. Pozen, A Skeptical View of Information Fiduciaries, 133
HARV. L. REV. 497, 497–98 (2019) (arguing that the concept of information fiduciaries con-
tains “a number of lurking tensions and ambiguities” and has a limited “capacity to resolve
them satisfactorily”); Andrew Keane Woods, Litigating Data Sovereignty, 128 YALE L.J. 328,
371–74 (2018) (arguing that disputes over state regulation of the internet are best resolved
through the doctrine of comity); Andrew Keane Woods, Against Data Exceptionalism, 68
STAN. L. REV. 729 , 755–56 (2016) (arguing that the issues surrounding government jurisdic-
tion to access personal data are not novel or unprecedented); Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky,
Taming the Golem: Challenges of Ethical Algorithmic Decision-making, 19 N.C. J.L. & TECH.
125, 125–26 (2017) (arguing that the law should distinguish between algorithms that lack “an
active editorial hand” and algorithms that are “intentionally framed to further a designer’s
policy agenda”); Jonathan Zittrain, Facebook Could Decide an Election Without Anyone Ever
Finding Out, NEW REPUBLIC (June 1, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/117878/informa
tion-fiduciary-solution-facebook-digital-gerrymandering [https://perma.cc/2JLT-8ABF] (argu-
ing that web companies should act as information fiduciaries, in which they agree not to use
data to put their own interests above those of their users).
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wasteful outcomes; and it may destabilize or undermine important systemic
structures. These critiques of the data economy are powerful and persuasive,
but they also have important counterpoints. Data may also lead to fairer or
more moral outcomes; it may lead to more efficient or optimal outcomes;
and it may buttress or support important systemic structures. The dichoto-
mies—that is, data’s tendency to simultaneously support and undermine im-
portant values—are essential to understanding the ways in which data
affects our legal regimes. This Part will explore these dichotomies with an
eye towards developing a more comprehensive view of the types of argu-
ments made about data.
A. Fairness
Arguably the most powerful and prevalent critiques of the data econ-
omy have been fairness-oriented, asserting that data generates a wide range
of harms to important moral values, such as dignity, freedom, equality, and
privacy. At the same time, some of the strongest defenses of greater data
usage have also focused on fairness, arguing instead that data can help pre-
serve those values in the modern world. What should we make of these com-
peting claims?
Let us begin by examining the fairness-oriented critiques of data. In
general, they fall into one of three categories: first, that the data economy
has raised serious privacy concerns for individuals; second, that the data
economy has led to invidious discrimination; and third, that the data econ-
omy fails to treat individuals as morally responsible actors. Let me say at the
outset that, while I will treat these critiques as predominantly morality-ori-
ented, they also have important efficiency and stability aspects. After all,
morally reprehensible actions can also be inefficient ones, and may well un-
dermine systemic values.
So how does the rise of the data economy harm our interests in privacy?
It can do so in a number of ways.132 At the most basic level, both govern-
ments and companies today collect and store vast troves of data about our
behavior, data that provides them intimate views into our lives. But the pri-
vacy critique of data would not be especially pernicious if it were simply an
observation that others know much about us. Every time I walk on the street
or go to work, people can observe large amounts of information about me:
what I choose to wear, my approximate age, my hair color, my gender, my
accent, my race. Arguably, some of these facts are more integral to my con-
ception of myself than what I bought on Amazon yesterday. But there are
elements of modern data collection practices that make it uniquely suited to
undermining our interests in keeping information about ourselves hidden
132 See ZITTRAIN, supra note 62, at 200–234. R
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from others—our “right ‘to be let alone,’” as Warren and Brandeis put it.133
While the concept of privacy is wide-ranging, and can encompass many dif-
ferent theoretically distinct values, most scholars writing on data tend to use
“privacy” to describe the interest that individuals have in choosing what to
reveal about themselves to others, and also what not to reveal.134 Data raises
a number of problems on this front. For one, current data practices may
simply not respect the choices of individuals about what they choose to hide
and to reveal.135 Companies may collect information about users without
user consent, or they may share information they rightfully received with
others without requesting consent for the additional sharing.136 Or they may
receive our consent to store data, but then fail to protect it, unwittingly al-
lowing hackers or unauthorized actors to access it.137 All of these scenarios
raise the very real possibility (indeed, given what we know today, the near
certainty) that we are more or less forced to share information about our-
selves that we would prefer to keep secret.138 Another major privacy problem
is that individuals may not fully understand what they are consenting to
when they “choose” to share data with companies or governments, or they
may fail to understand the consequences of data collection.139 The massive
amounts of information being collected from us often are provided by us
without our full knowledge—at most, we may have clicked “accept” on a
terms-and-conditions page, but we probably don’t remember the terms, and
even if we do, we probably aren’t actively thinking about them as we go
about our data-generating days.140 Similarly, the magnitude of data today has
meant that even “anonymized” data—that is, databases that have removed
names and other identifying information—can be used in conjunction with
133 See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 195 (1890) (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE
WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 29 (2d ed. 1879)).
134 See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1464
(2000) (defining “informational privacy” as “the ability to control the acquisition or release of
information about oneself”).
135 See generally Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma,
126 HARV. L. REV. 1880 (2013).
136 See id. at 1881.
137 See Jonathan Mayer, Government Hacking, 127 YALE L.J. 570, 586–89 (2018).
138 See Cameron F. Kerry, Why Protecting Privacy Is a Losing Game Today—and How to
Change the Game, BROOKINGS INST. (Jul. 12, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/why-
protecting-privacy-is-a-losing-game-today-and-how-to-change-the-game/ [https://perma.cc/
7AW5-VU9Y].
139 See Anita L. Allen, Protecting One’s Own Privacy in a Big Data Economy, 130 HARV.
L. REV. F. 71, 71–72 (2016).
140 See Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyber Law Might Teach, 113 HARV.
L. REV. 501, 510 (1999) (“We wander through cyberspace, unaware of the technologies that
gather and track our behavior. We cannot function in life if we assume that everywhere we go
such information is collected. Collection practices differ, depending on the site and its objec-
tives. To consent to being tracked, we must know that data is being collected. But the architec-
ture disables (relative to real space) our ability to know when we are being monitored, and to
take steps to limit that monitoring.”).
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other databases to identify individuals.141 When in the hands of governments,
this data could be used to chill the exercise of civil liberties and free speech
rights or target politically unpopular groups.142 When in the hands of hackers
and robbers, it could be used to steal and harass.
Another major fairness-oriented critique of the modern data economy is
its potential to lead to discrimination against minority groups. It is a funda-
mental principle of the law that we should not use factors such as race,
religion, or sex to make important decisions about whom to hire, rent to, and
make a loan to. But the widespread shift to data-driven decision-making
might make such discrimination simultaneously more likely and more diffi-
cult to root out.143 Scholars have identified a number of mechanisms by
which this might work. First, governments or companies, or officials inside
of these entities, might intentionally create algorithms that discriminate
against disfavored groups.144 Banks might, for example, use a credit-scoring
algorithm that makes mortgage decisions based on factors that they know to
be correlated with race, such as ZIP Code or first name.145 It would be diffi-
cult for an outside observer to know, based on reviewing the code for the
algorithm, whether the coder was motivated by racial animus when they as-
signed weights to particular factors.146 And given the massive amount of data
available about individuals today, and thus the wide variety of seemingly
objective factors that might be used to make decisions, data might be used to
hide invidious discrimination.147 Second, governments or companies might
unintentionally rely on algorithms that they believe to be unbiased and accu-
141 See generally Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising
Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701 (2010).
142 See Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1962–64
(2013).
143 See Jack M. Balkin, The Three Laws of Robotics in the Age of Big Data, 78 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1217, 1238–40 (2017); Barocas & Selbst, supra note 9, at 694–714; Stephanie Bornstein,
Antidiscriminatory Algorithms, 70 ALA. L. REV. 519, 523–24 (2018); Bruckner, supra note 9, R
at 25–27; Chander, supra note 9, at 1026; Gillis & Spiess, supra note 9, at 459; Margaret Hu, R
Algorithmic Jim Crow, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 633, 658–60 (2017); Aziz Z. Huq, Racial Equity
in Algorithmic Criminal Justice, 68 DUKE L.J. 1043, 1115–23 (2019); Mikella Hurley & Julius
Adebayo, Credit Scoring in the Era of Big Data, 18 YALE J.L. & TECH. 148, 149 (2016);
Katyal, supra note 9, at 56; Jon Kleinberg et al., Discrimination in the Age of Algorithms, 10 J. R
LEGAL ANALYSIS 113, 114 (2018); Kroll et al., supra note 9, at 678; David Lehr & Paul Ohm, R
Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should Learn About Machine Learning, 51 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 653, 703–05 (2017); Ziad Obermeyer et al., Dissecting Racial Bias in an Al-
gorithm Used to Manage the Health of Populations, 366 SCIENCE 447, 450 (2019); Tene &
Polonetsky, supra note 131, at 135. R
144 See Lehr & Ohm, supra note 143, at 703–04. R
145 See Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for
Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 13–14 (2014) (“Credit scores are only as free
from bias as the software and data behind them. Software engineers construct the datasets
mined by scoring systems; they define the parameters of data-mining analyses; they create the
clusters, links, and decision trees applied; they generate the predictive models applied. The
biases and values of system developers and software programmers are embedded into each and
every step of development.”).
146 See Lehr & Ohm, supra note 143, at 656.
147 See Lehr & Ohm, supra note 143, at 656.
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rate, but that, in reality, incorporate biased data or assumptions.148 They
might, for example, use an algorithm to determine the likelihood that a felon
will re-offend based on factors such as prior offenses and personality disor-
ders, but if it turns out that juries are more likely to convict individuals of
certain racial groups with committing crimes, or if psychologists are more
likely to diagnose people of certain genders with personality disorders, then
the algorithm itself may lead to results that systematically discriminate
against these groups, even if it appears to be based on objective factors.149
And it turns out that an enormous number of “objective” factors are in fact
correlated with race, sex, religion, or national origin.150 Even more problem-
atically, one of the most popular methods of analyzing large datasets is ma-
chine learning—and, to be more precise, the sub-category of machine
learning known as deep learning or neural networks—which tends to pro-
vide analyses that are particularly complex and difficult to interpret, making
the actual identification of bias in decision-making even more opaque.151
Thus, many observers argue, the proliferation of the data economy has raised
concerns about its contribution to systemic discrimination.
Finally, another fairness-based critique of the data economy has been
that data collection and usage practices fail to respect the dignity and equal-
ity of individuals as moral actors. According to this view, in some contexts,
it is simply inappropriate to treat individuals as an agglomeration of statisti-
cal data points, rather than autonomous moral beings deserving of recogni-
tion as such.152 Making important decisions about their welfare based on
computer algorithms and datasets inflicts deep-rooted harm to our concep-
tions of individuality and participation.153 These issues are particularly sali-
ent in the area of criminal justice. Take, for example, parole decisions. A
number of states utilize a commercial software program, COMPAS, in mak-
148 See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 9, at 672. R
149 Cf. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 9, at 677–94. R
150 See Gillis & Spiess, supra note 9, at 464–72. R
151 See Finale Doshi-Velez et al., Accountability of AI Under the Law: The Role of Expla-
nation, BERKMAN KLEIN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y 6–9 (2017), https://cyber.harvard.edu/
publications/2017/11/AIExplanation [https://perma.cc/5KW2-JD4U]; Jenna Burrell, How the
Machine ‘Thinks’: Understanding Opacity in Machine Learning Algorithms, 3 BIG DATA &
SOC’Y 1, 5–8 (2016); Aaron M. Bornstein, Is Artificial Intelligence Permanently Inscrutable?,
NAUTILUS (Sept. 1, 2016), http://nautil.us/issue/40/learning/is-artificial-intelligence-permanent
ly-inscrutable [https://perma.cc/2U79-JN5Q].
152 Tal Zarsky, The Trouble with Algorithmic Decisions: An Analytic Road Map to Ex-
amine Efficiency and Fairness in Automated and Opaque Decision Making, 41 SCI. TECH. &
HUMAN VALUES 118, 118–19, 129 (2016); Sofia Grafanaki, Autonomy Challenges in the Age of
Big Data, 27 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 803, 843–44 (2017).
153 See Ric Simmons, Big Data, Machine Judges, and the Legitimacy of the Criminal
Justice System, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1067, 1076–85 (2018); but see Aziz Z. Huq, A Right to
a Human Decision, 106 VA. L. REV. 611, 612 (2020) (arguing that “concerns about due pro-
cess, privacy, and discrimination in machine decisions are typically best addressed through a
justiciable ‘right to a well-calibrated machine decision’”).
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ing parole decisions.154 The COMPAS algorithm uses data about prior re-
offense levels to create an individualized risk assessment, and its recommen-
dations have been used on numerous occasions to support decisions to deny
individuals parole.155 Some scholars have argued that this kind of algorithm-
based treatment, which reduces individuals to a collection of data points,
violates the rights of individuals to due process and, more generally, fair and
respectful treatment.156 We simply should not make decisions about freedom
and imprisonment based on these kinds of simplifying and reductive fac-
tors.157 But it is not just in the realm of criminal justice that data raises dig-
nity and equality concerns. Similar arguments have been made in the context
of genetic information and targeted advertising and online speech.158 While
these types of fairness critiques are broad and varied, they all involve some
wider concern about treating humans as statistics, not moral actors.
But if some scholars believe that the data economy is, in one way or
another, leading to unfair results or processes, many others believe that it in
fact leads to the opposite outcome—more fair, more just decisions. Let us
start with the question of privacy. It is assuredly true that, for the vast major-
ity of people, the proliferation of data collection, storage, and use in the
modern world has led to more entities having more information about them.
This reduces the ability of people to hide information about themselves from
others. But the flipside is that the data economy has also given people signif-
154 See Niraj Chokshi, Can Software Predict Crime? Maybe So, But No Better Than a
Human, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/19/us/computer-
software-human-decisions.html [https://perma.cc/RB4V-LG83].
155 See Aziz Z. Huq, Racial Equity in Algorithmic Criminal Justice, 68 DUKE L.J. 1043,
1047–48 (2019); BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND
PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE 31–34 (2007).
156 See J.C. Oleson, Risk in Sentencing: Constitutionally Suspect Variables and Evidence-
Based Sentencing, 64 SMU L. REV. 1329, 1388–93 (2011); John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of
Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm Among Prisoners, Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L.
REV. 391, 427–28 (2006).
157 See Emily Berman, A Government of Laws and Not of Machines, 98 B.U. L. REV.
1277, 1331 (2018) (“In each of these contexts, questions that deserve serious democratic,
deliberative consideration are instead decided by law enforcement and national security offi-
cials or the vendors who supply them with analytic products. This is a troubling short-circuit of
the democratic process around important policy debates.”); Daniel J. Steinbock, Data Match-
ing, Data Mining, and Due Process, 40 GA. L. REV. 1, 78 (2005) (“Challenges to the algo-
rithms used in data matching or data mining . . . may not fit well with the kind of
individualized hearings that are the due process paradigm.”).
158 See Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object,
52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1377 (2000) (“[O]ne must, if one values the individual as an agent of
self-determination and community-building, take seriously a conception of data privacy that
returns control over much personal data to the individual. We must carve out protected zones
of personal autonomy, so that productive expression and development can have room to flour-
ish.”); Joseph W. Jerome, Buying and Selling Privacy: Big Data’s Different Burdens and Bene-
fits, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 47, 50 (2013) (“Ever-increasing data collection and analysis
have the potential to exacerbate class disparities. They will improve market efficiency, and
market efficiency favors the wealthy, established classes.”); Natalie Ram, Genetic Privacy
After Carpenter, 105 VA. L. REV. 1357, 1381 (2019) (“[G]enetic information is ‘deeply re-
vealing,’ and so it is presumptively private in nature.”).
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icantly more ability to reveal information about themselves to others.159 This,
after all, is the foundation of modern social media platforms: they provide
people with a truly unique and powerful way to reveal important facts about
themselves with others.160 And it is not just social media that benefits from
the magnitude, permanence, and portability of data. Individuals can now
share their data for many other purposes, such as proving that they have the
means to pay back a mortgage,161 or to show that they really do have a de-
gree from a particular educational institution,162 or to improve their invest-
ment portfolio.163 Many important features of the data economy today are
only possible because individuals have the capacity to reveal more informa-
tion about themselves more broadly. Uber and Lyft, after all, would never
have existed if there weren’t convenient ways for people to share their loca-
tions with others. Thus, while the prevalence, portability, and permanence of
data have generally reduced people’s ability to hide information from others,
they have also increased people’s ability to reveal information to others.
Whether, on balance, this is more or less fair for private citizens is, thus, not
so straightforward.
Similarly, with respect to discrimination, many scholars have argued
that wider use of data can in fact reduce, not exacerbate, concerns about
decisions being made based on improper considerations such as race or sex.
The arguments here are relatively straightforward. First, while algorithms
may be biased against certain groups (either because of faulty programming,
imperfect data, or some other reason), so are human beings.164 The question
159 See Susan Park & Patricia Sanchez Abril, Digital Self-Ownership: A Publicity-Rights
Framework for Determining Employee Social Media Rights, 53 AM. BUS. L.J. 537, 568–70
(2016); Michael Bromley, et al., The Social Reality of Blogging and Empowerment Among
Malaysian Bloggers, 23 J. ASIAN PAC. COMMISSION 210, 214 (2013). See generally MARTHA
MCCAUGHEY ET AL., CYBERACTIVISM: ONLINE ACTIVISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (Martha
McCaughey & Michael D. Ayers eds., 2003).
160 Facebook’s Mission Statement provides that the company’s mission is to “give people
the power to build community and bring the world closer together. People use Facebook to
stay connected with friends and family, to discover what’s going on in the world, and to share
and express what matters to them.” See FAQs, FACEBOOK, https://investor.fb.com/resources/
default.aspx. [https://perma.cc/N936-N9T5]. Twitter’s Mission Statement provides that its
mission is to “give everyone the power to create and share ideas and information instantly
without barriers.” See FAQ, TWITTER, https://investor.twitterinc.com/contact/faq/default.aspx
[https://perma.cc/3AJ8-R25C].
161 See AITE GROUP, ALTERNATIVE DATA ACROSS THE LOAN LIFE CYCLE: HOW FINTECH
AND OTHER LENDERS USE IT AND WHY 7-8 (2018), https://www.experian.com/assets/consumer
-information/reports/Experian_Aite_AltDataReport_Final_120418.pdf [https://perma.cc/
LE4G-Z2Y3].
162 See Sean Gallagher, How the Value of Educational Credentials Is and Isn’t Changing,
HARV BUS. REV., (Sept. 20, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/09/how-the-value-of-educational-cre
dentials-is-and-isnt-changing, [https://perma.cc/4F4D-SLQY].
163 See Victoria Guida, Banks, Fintech Startups Clash Over ‘The New Oil’ — Your Data,
POLITICO (Feb. 7, 2020, 6:24 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/02/07/banks-fintech-
startups-clash-over-the-new-oil-your-data-112188 [https://perma.cc/Q4LT-QUPQ].
164 For one of the classic studies on racial bias in hiring, see Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil
Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Exper-
iment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 991, 992–93, 1011 (2004).
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we need to ask is not whether basing our decisions on data will lead to
perfectly unbiased decisions, but rather whether doing so will lead to deci-
sions that are less biased than having human beings make the decisions.165
And there are strong reasons to believe that, in many contexts, human deci-
sion-makers are more prone to bias than well-written, well-scrutinized algo-
rithms.166 Second, even in the contexts where algorithmic decision-making
based on large datasets will be subject to strong bias, it is relatively simple to
detect that bias.167 Through back-testing, variable adjustment, and zero-
knowledge proofs, policymakers can review whether the results of the data
analysis are leading to results that systematically disfavor certain groups.168
Even in machine learning contexts, where opacity is a concern, there are
ways to determine how much of a role particular factors, such as race, sex,
or religion, are playing in the result.169 Thus, even if discrimination is a prob-
lem in the Big Data world, it is easier to identify that discrimination when it
occurs. And finally, with respect to remedies, while it is extraordinarily dif-
ficult to eliminate biases in human decision-making, it is much easier to do
so with data-based algorithms.170 One can simply adjust variables, change
data, or eliminate certain factors that the algorithm uses so that discrimina-
tion based on certain features is removed.171 In one study focused on health
care, in which the researchers found that a widely used algorithm for assess-
ing risk was systematically underestimating the health needs of black pa-
tients, the researchers found that if they simply reformulated the algorithm to
eliminate costs as a proxy for needs, the racial bias was removed.172 Thus,
wider use of data may well be the best tool we have for reducing systemic
discrimination.173
Finally, and on a related note, scholars have argued that greater and
wider use of data is the best way to promote dignity and equality in the
world.174 It is not just that it might lead to less discrimination, although this
is assuredly an important part of the argument. It is also that, if we take
seriously Platonic arguments about self-knowledge as a route to empower-
ment, then creating and storing more information in more easily accessible
165 See Huq, supra note 153, at 638–39. R
166 See Huq, supra note 153, at 638–39. R
167 See Jon Kleinberg et al., Discrimination in the Age of Algorithms, 10 J. LEGAL ANALY-
SIS 113, 113 (2019); Barocas & Selbst, supra note 9, at 700–01; Kroll et al., supra note 9, at R
682–90.
168 See Kroll et al., supra note 9, at 668–69. R
169 See Kroll et al., supra note 9, at 668–69. R
170 See Edward H. Chang et al., The Mixed Effects of Online Diversity Training, 116 PNAS
7778, 7778 (2019).
171 See Obermeyer et al., supra note 143, at 447. But see Devin Desai and Joshua A. Kroll, R
Trust but Verify: A Guide to Algorithms and the Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 11 (2017)
(discussing the limits of monitoring and regulating algorithms).
172 See Obermeyer et al., supra note 143, at 447. R
173 See Kleinberg et al., supra note 167, at 113. R
174 See, e.g., Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control
in the Age of Analytics, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 239, 241–42 (2013).
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and analyzable forms might well be the best way to promote individual well-
being.175 Just as importantly, respecting the voluntary decisions of individu-
als about how and what to disclose and share with others might well require
us to accept that people simply desire to share data with companies in order
to receive their services.176
B. Efficiency
But just as there are serious questions about the fairness of the data
economy, there are also questions about its efficiency. Setting aside whether
we believe the data economy is desirable from a moral or ethical perspec-
tive, we might still want to know whether it is leading to more informed,
speedier, or cheaper transactions. And just as we saw on the question of
fairness, we will also see that scholars have sharply opposing viewpoints on
this question.177
Let us begin with the arguments that data usage today is leading to
inefficient results. One of the most common concerns about the data econ-
omy has been that companies are using the vast troves of data they have on
consumers to manipulate and exploit them.178 We know, for example, that
companies use large databases on consumer behavior to narrowly target ad-
vertising to particular users.179 A number of scholars have argued that this
provides companies with a powerful tool to take advantage of the cognitive
175 For an analysis of Plato’s arguments about knowledge and philosophy, see MALCOLM
SCHOFIELD, PLATO: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 136–94 (2006). For a discussion of the welfare-
enhancing effects of data, see VIKTOR MAYER-SCHONBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA:
A REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 17–18 (2014).
176 But see Spencer Williams, Predictive Contracting, 2019 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 621,
689–91 (2019).
177 The reader might well ask why discrimination is not included in this Part on the effi-
ciency concerns of data. After all, if algorithms used to determine who receives a loan or who
receives health care treatment systematically discriminate against minorities, this must assur-
edly be an inefficient outcome. The author does not disagree. The primary reason for catego-
rizing discrimination as a fairness-oriented problem of data, not an efficiency-oriented one, is
simply that the arguments about discrimination tend to focus more on issues of autonomy and
equality, and less on transaction costs and market failures. But the overlapping nature of these
problems highlights just how contentious the debates over categorization can be.
178 See Jonathan Zittrain, How to Exercise the Power You Didn’t Ask For, HARV. BUS.
REV. (Sept. 19, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/09/how-to-exercise-the-power-you-didnt-ask-for
[https://perma.cc/B7J9-C9TC]; Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 995, 1022 (2014); Sandra Wachter & Brent Mittelstadt, A Right to Reasonable Infer-
ences: Re-Thinking Data Protection Law in the Age of Big Data and AI, 2019 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 494, 505–15 (2019); Ryan Calo & Alex Rosenblat, The Taking Economy: Uber, Informa-
tion, and Power, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1623, 1651 (2017); Daniel Susser, et al., Online Manip-
ulation: Hidden Influences in a Digital World, 4 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 1, 3–4 (2019); Chris Jay
Hoofnagle et al., Behavioral Advertising: The Offer You Cannot Refuse, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y
REV. 273, 291–95 (2012).
179 See Stuart A. Thompson, These Ads Think They Know You, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/04/30/opinion/privacy-targeted-advertis
ing.html [https://perma.cc/5H2H-PCAA].
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biases of consumers.180 This might well lead to a unique kind of market fail-
ure, where consumers are regularly duped into purchasing products or ser-
vices that they do not truly want or at prices that are unreasonably high.181 Of
course, this is a feature of all advertising—the very premise of advertising is
that it leads consumers to purchase things that they would not have pur-
chased otherwise.182 But the nature of data today makes it easier for compa-
nies to acquire information about consumers and act on it in intrusive
ways—by, for example, seeing that you visited a Nike website this morning
to look for running shoes and then running Nike ads on your future website
visits.183 This opens up entirely new ways of manipulating consumer
behavior.
A second major efficiency-related critique of the data economy is that
large companies may use data to create or strengthen dominant competitive
positions.184 Data, after all, has become an ever more valuable resource, one
that allows companies to sell services, develop strategies, and understand
market behaviors in ever more sophisticated ways.185 But if a few large com-
panies—such as Google and Facebook, or JP Morgan and Goldman Sachs,
or Amazon and Walmart—possess vastly more data than other actors, they
may well be able to develop impregnable positions that exclude other en-
180 See Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 995 (2014).
181 See Tal Zarsky, Online Privacy, Tailoring, and Persuasion, in PRIVACY AND TECHNOL-
OGIES OF IDENTITY: A CROSS-DISCIPLINARY CONVERSATION 219–20 (Katherine J. Strandburg
& Daniela Stan Raicu eds., 2006).
182 See Shmuel I. Becher & Yuval Feldman, Manipulating, Fast and Slow: The Law of
Non-Verbal Market Manipulations, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 459, 461 (2016) (“The basic premise
of the science of marketing is that consumers’ purchasing decisions are highly influenced by
sellers’ manipulation and selling tactics.”).
183 See Calo, supra note 180, at 1010 (“Emerging methods of big data present a new and R
vastly more efficient way to identify cognitive bias by attempting to pinpoint profitable anom-
alies. Rather than hypothesize and then test a promising deviation, as a lab experimenter
would, firms can work backward from raw data.”).
184 See Lina M. Khan, The Separation of Platforms and Commerce, 119 COLUM. L. REV.
973, 1025 (2019); Kai-Uwe Kühn & Steve Tadelis, Algorithmic Collusion, Address before the
Competition and Regulation European Summer School and Conference (CRESSE) (2017),
https://www.cresse.info/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/2017_sps5_pr2_Algorithmic-Collusion.
pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2G5-5A4K]; FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE COMPETITION AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION ISSUES OF ALGORITHMS, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, AND PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS
(Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/audio-video/audio/algorithmic-collusion
[https://perma.cc/8LMM-F3QT]; Antonio Capobianco, Algorithms and Collusion, ORG.
ECON. COOP. & DEV. 5, 16–22 (2017); Azriel Ezrachi & Maurice E. Stucke, Artificial Intelli-
gence & Collusion: When Computers Inhibit Competition, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1775, 1777
(2017); Kira Radinsky, Data Monopolists Like Google Are Threatening the Economy, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Mar. 2, 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/03/data-monopolists-like-google-are-threaten-
ing-the-economy [https://perma.cc/6NBA-TKFM]; Nathan Newman, Search, Antitrust, and
the Economics of the Control of User Data, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 401, 421–23 (2014); Rory Van
Loo, Making Innovation More Competitive: The Case of Fintech, 65 UCLA L. REV. 232, 243
(2018); Yafit Lev-Aretz & Katherine J. Strandburg, Privacy Regulation and Innovation Policy,
22 YALE J.L. & TECH. 256, 304 (2020).
185 See Van Loo, supra note 184, at 242–43. R
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\58-1\HLL102.txt unknown Seq: 31  9-FEB-21 14:49
2021] A Unified Theory of Data 53
trants in the market.186 The resulting monopolies could lead to less useful or
more costly services being offered to consumers.187 As access to data be-
comes an ever more crucial component in business strategies, the data econ-
omy could lead to markets being dominated by fewer, but larger,
companies.188
A third, and somewhat conflicting, efficiency-related critique of the
modern data economy is that widespread reliance on large datasets might
well lead to worse decision-making by the users of data themselves.189 The
arguments here are multifold, but their basic thrust is that algorithmic analy-
ses possess certain characteristics that tend to skew or constrain the decision-
making processes.190 For example, it is a known problem in machine learning
that deep learning algorithms—which analyze historical datasets for pat-
terns—tend to struggle with problems that exhibit “non-stationary” behav-
ior, that is, where the performance of the observed target changes over
time.191 If an airline company had trained its algorithm on data on consumer
patterns before the coronavirus pandemic, it might well have done a bad job
at predicting consumer behavior after the pandemic, given the fundamental
changes in psychology, society, and law that the pandemic ushered in. Other
biases in machine learning exist as well, from difficulties handling low-prev-
alence subsets of populations to problems with overfitting data to training
sets.192 Another, perhaps even more troubling efficiency problem is the inter-
action between human decision-makers and data.193 Data is a tool, and it can
be used to help identify unexpected relationships between variables, to spot
patterns, and to analyze information faster than humans could ever do. This
can obviously be tremendously helpful to policymakers, but it also creates
the risk that humans will put too much weight on the recommendations that
186 See Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Michal S. Gal, Access Barriers to Big Data, 59 ARIZ. L.
REV. 339, 370 (2017).
187 See Simon Loertscher & Leslie M. Marx, Digital Monopolies: Privacy Protection or
Price Regulation?, 71 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 1, 12 (2020).
188 See Maurice E. Stucke, Should We Be Concerned About Data-Opolies?, 2 GEO. L.
TECH. REV. 275, 323–24 (2018).
189 See Yesha Yadav, How Algorithmic Trading Undermines Efficiency in Capital Markets,
68 VAND. L. REV. 1607, 1617–31 (2015); Rory Van Loo, The Rise of the Digital Regulator, 66
DUKE L.J. 1267, 1294 (2017); William Magnuson, Financial Regulation in the Bitcoin Era, 23
STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 159, 202 (2018).
190 See Magnuson, supra note 43, at 355–65. R
191 See generally MASASHI SUGIYAMA & MOTOAKI KAWANABE, MACHINE LEARNING IN
NON-STATIONARY ENVIRONMENTS: INTRODUCTION TO COVARIATE SHIFT ADAPTATION (2012).
192 See STUART J. RUSSELL & PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A MODERN AP-
PROACH 705 (3d ed. 2010); RICHARD BERK, STATISTICAL LEARNING FROM A REGRESSION PER-
SPECTIVE 142 (2008); Lehr & Ohm, supra note 143, at 678–84; Joy Buolamwini & Timnit R
Gebru, Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in Commercial Gender Classifica-
tion, 81 PROC. MACHINE LEARNING RES. 1, 1–2 (2018), http://proceedings.mlr.press/v81/buo
lamwini18a/buolamwini18a.pdf [https://perma.cc/G8VD-LZG7].
193 See, e.g., Nizan Geslevich Packin, Consumer Finance and AI: The Death of Second
Opinions?, 22 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 319, 346–49 (2020); A. Michael Froomkin, et
al., When AIs Outperform Doctors: Confronting the Challenges of a Tort-Induced Over-Reli-
ance on Machine Learning, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 33, 72–81 (2019).
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algorithms generate.194 In other words, as governments, companies, and indi-
viduals gain access to large datasets and algorithms capable of analyzing
them, they may well be tempted, not just to use the data to improve their
decisions, but also to entirely replace their own judgment with the judgment
of the algorithm. They might simply accept the algorithm’s recommendation
that an accused criminal represents a flight risk, or its conclusion that a bor-
rower does not deserve a loan, or its advice that a patient should receive a
particular treatment, without further reflection or consideration. A tool might
quickly become a crutch.
But other scholars have argued that, far from creating efficiency losses,
data will lead to enormous efficiency gains. Indeed, of all the arguments in
favor of wider data creation, storage, and use, greater efficiency is likely the
most common. Data can be used in innumerable ways to empower and in-
form individuals.195 Data about school outcomes and test scores empowers
parents to decide where to educate their children.196 Data about hospital per-
formance empowers patients to decide where to receive medical treatment.197
Data about spending patterns and financial outcomes empowers people to
save for houses, retirements, and other goals.198 Consumers need data in or-
der to make these decisions. And in order for that data to be provided, they
often need either governments or companies to gather and disseminate it.
The data economy may also lead to more competitive markets with
fewer dominant players.199 Far from creating monopolies and erecting barri-
ers to entry, some scholars argue, data has become a tool for small start-ups
and enterprising tech companies to compete with large incumbents like
194 See Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249,
1271–72 (2008); Linda J. Skitka et al., Automation Bias and Errors: Are Crews Better than
Individuals?, 10 INT’L J. AVIATION PSYCHOL. 85, 85 (2000); Packin, supra note 193, at 322. R
195 See Van Loo, supra note 184, at 238–42. R
196 See, e.g., DEP’T OF EDUC., EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT STATE AND LOCAL REPORT
CARDS NON-REGULATORY GUIDANCE (2017), https://www2.ed.gov/policy/elsec/leg/essa/essa
statereportcard.pdf [https://perma.cc/4QXY-QGNR]; Jenny Abamu, How Transparent Is
School Data When Parents Can’t Find or Understand It?, EDSURGE (June 26, 2018), https://
www.edsurge.com/news/2018-06-26-how-transparent-is-school-data-when-parents-can-t-find-
or-understand-it [https://perma.cc/F7RD-LF99].
197 See generally Jeffrey H. Silber, When Public Reporting Misleads the Public: The Case
of Medicare’s Hospital Compare Mortality Model, 68 DEPAUL L. REV. 407 (2019); Nathan
Cortez, Regulation by Database, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (2018).
198 See generally Rory Van Loo, Digital Market Perfection, 117 MICH. L. REV. 815
(2019); Benjamin P. Edwards, The Rise of Automated Investment Advice: Can Robo-Advisers
Rescue the Retail Market?, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 97 (2018); Christopher G. Bradley, Fintech’s
Double Edges, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 61 (2018); Chris Brummer & Yesha Yadav, Fintech and
the Innovation Trilemma, 107 GEO. L.J. 235 (2019); William Magnuson, Regulating Fintech,
71 VAND. L. REV. 1167 (2018); William Magnuson, Financial Regulation in the Bitcoin Era,
23 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 159 (2018).
199 See Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925, 938
(2001); Michael Del Priore, The Trope of Parity, 36 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 181, 206–08
(2018); Ilene Knable Gotts & Joseph G. Krauss, Antitrust Review of New Economy Acquisi-
tions, 15 ANTITRUST 59, 59 (2000); D. Daniel Sokol & Roisin Comerford, Antitrust and Regu-
lating Big Data, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1129, 1136 (2016); Deborah T. Tate, Net Neutrality
10 Years Later: A Still Unconvinced Commissioner, 66 FED. COMM. L.J. 509, 518 (2014).
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never before.200 Fintech companies are competing for market share with
large Wall Street banks.201 Health technology, or “healthtech,” startups, with
just tens of employees, are competing with large pharmaceutical companies
with thousands.202 And despite the dominance of social media companies
like Facebook and Twitter, it is worth remembering that these companies
were themselves startups just fifteen years ago.203 And their dominance has
been due to a large extent by the fact that they have acquired new entrants,
not that new entrants have failed to emerge at all.204 Data, if anything, has
led to significantly lower costs of entry.
More generally, many scholars have argued that digital data is the key
to better decision-making in the internet era.205 Pharmaceutical companies
can develop vaccines to defeat pandemics because of their ability to gather
and analyze large amounts of data.206 Self-driving car companies can design
safer automobiles because of their ability to fine-tune their algorithms.207
And while machine learning algorithms have weaknesses—what method of
analysis does not?—they also have tremendous strengths, and have led to
remarkable breakthroughs in areas as diverse as image and voice recogni-
tion, mapping, and fraud detection.208 Data can be used in all these scenarios
to augment or improve human decision-making. Thus, to many, the data
200 See Sokol & Comerford, supra note 199, at 1136 (“The data requirements of new R
competitors are far more modest and qualitatively different than those of more established
firms. Little, if any, user data is required as a starting point for most online services. Instead,
firms may enter with innovative new products that skillfully address customer needs, and
quickly collect data from users, which they can then use for further product improvement and
success. As such, new entrants are unlikely to be at a significant competitive disadvantage
relative to incumbents in terms of data collection or analysis.”).
201 See Magnuson, Regulating Fintech, supra note 198, at 1173–87. R
202 See Jorge L. Contreras, The False Promise of Health Data Ownership, 94 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 625, 627–30 (2019).
203 Ashlee Vance, Facebook: The Making of 1 Billion Users, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 4, 2012),
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2012-10-04/facebook-the-making-of-1-billion-users
[https://perma.cc/6ZQN-44PV]; Matthew Braga, Twitter’s Road to IPO: Grow First, Monetize
Later, FIN. POST (Sept. 13, 2013), http://business.financialpost.com/fp-tech-desk/twitters-road-
to-ipo-grow-first-monetize-later [https://perma.cc/3LZ9-CWXR].
204 See John F. Coyle & Gregg D. Polsky, Acqui-Hiring, 63 Duke L.J. 281, 283–84 (2013);
Kara Swisher, Big Tech’s Takeovers Finally Get Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2020), https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/02/14/opinion/ftc-investigation-google-facebook.html [https://
perma.cc/W2B4-TQJJ].
205 Susan Athey, Beyond Prediction: Using Big Data for Policy Problems, 355 SCIENCE
483, 483 (2017); Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Deci-
sion Making in the Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147, 1223 (2017); Huq, supra note
153, at 638–39 (“Even when there is a human substitute for a decision, moreover, studies in a R
variety of fields suggest that large gains in human well-being can be attained by using a ma-
chine-learning tool rather than a person.”).
206 See Cade Metz, Making New Drugs with a Dose of Artificial Intelligence, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/05/technology/artificial-intelligence-drug-
research-deepmind.html [https://perma.cc/2SY3-HC3N].
207 See Nidhi Kalra & David G. Groves, The Enemy of Good: Estimating the Cost of
Waiting for Nearly Perfect Automated Vehicles, RAND CO. 3 (2017), https://www.rand.org/
pubs/research_reports/RR2150.html [https://perma.cc/V2ZG-MHYQ].
208 See Magnuson, supra note 43, at 339. R
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economy will lead to more, not less, efficiency in markets and decision-
making.
C. Stability
Finally, another important strand of data scholarship focuses on how
the data economy will affect the broader stability of existing systems. Will
data change the fundamental nature of government? Will it render markets
more prone to crashes? Will it disrupt the relationship between labor and
capital? Scholars operating in a wide variety of fields have argued that data
raises systemic stability concerns and have called for reforms to reduce the
risks. At the same time, another group of scholars, sometimes in dialogue
with the first group, and sometimes not, assert that data will make these
systems more resilient and less prone to disruption.
One of the central stability-focused critiques of the data economy is that
it will undermine our democratic system of government. It might do so in a
variety of ways. First, the wide availability of copious amounts of informa-
tion about citizens might lead governments to grow more oppressive as they
ramp up surveillance of their populations.209 Media reports of recent years
have raised serious alarms about governments around the world using data
collection to crack down on civil dissent. With the capacity to track citizens’
movements, actions, and words with ever-greater precision, governments
can punish citizens for behaviors that they would never have even been able
to observe before. But it is not just surveillance that scholars are worried
about. Another major concern is that companies, political groups, or foreign
governments will use data to manipulate political outcomes.210 In the 2016
election, Russian government hackers penetrated the accounts and com-
puters of Hillary Clinton’s campaign for president and leaked embarrassing
emails.211 In 2019, Facebook announced that it had identified (and removed)
four different government-backed disinformation campaigns on the social
media site.212 The possibility that bad actors might use or alter data to
achieve nefarious political goals, such as tilting an election in favor of a
209 See Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1945–57
(2013). See generally SURVEILLANCE AND DEMOCRACY (Kevin D. Haggerty & Minas Samatas
eds., 2010); REBECCA MACKINNON, CONSENT OF THE NETWORKED (2012); EVGENY MOROZOV,
THE NET DELUSION (2011).
210 See Ido Kilovaty, Legally Cognizable Manipulation, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 449, 452
(2019) (“[P]erpetrators may use personal information not only for direct financial gain, as
they did for more than two decades, but also for the largely unanticipated political manipula-
tion and direct microtargeting of the data subjects.”).
211 See Ellen Nakashima & Shane Harris, How the Russians Hacked the DNC and Passed
Its Emails to Wikipedia, WASH. POST (July 13, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/how-the-russians-hacked-the-dnc-and-passed-its-emails-to-wikileaks/2018/
07/13/af19a828-86c3-11e8-8553-a3ce89036c78_story.html [https://perma.cc/FQM5-4EML].
212 See Mike Isaac, Facebook Finds New Disinformation Campaigns and Braces for 2020
Torrent, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/21/technology/
facebook-disinformation-russia-iran.html [https://perma.cc/8664-Y97X].
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candidate or fomenting division within society, has become a major focus of
intelligence agencies in recent years.213 The nature of data today—its magni-
tude, its permanence, and its portability—provides determined adversaries a
number of avenues for affecting wider political systems.
Another major critique of the data economy is that it has rendered mar-
kets more volatile and prone to crashes.214 The arguments here tend to focus
on how the accelerating trend towards algorithmic trading, based on analyses
of financial data, could lead to system-wide effects that alter the nature of
stock markets.215 High-frequency traders that specialize in rapid purchases
and sales of securities, for example, might increase the speed of market
shifts, and thereby increase panic among other investors.216 The complexity
of data-based financial algorithms might make the process of identifying risk
213 See Press Release, Nat’l Sec. Agency, Joint Statement from DOJ, DOD, DHS, DNI,
FBI, NSA, and CISA on Ensuring Security of 2020 Elections (Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.nsa.
gov/news-features/press-room/Article/2009338/joint-statement-from-doj-dod-dhs-dni-fbi-nsa-
and-cisa-on-ensuring-security-of-2/ [https://perma.cc/WHG4-Z2QY] (“Russia, China, Iran,
and other foreign malicious actors all will seek to interfere in the voting process or influence
voter perceptions. Adversaries may try to accomplish their goals through a variety of means,
including social media campaigns, directing disinformation operations or conducting disrup-
tive or destructive cyber-attacks on state and local infrastructure.”). See generally S. SELECT
COMM. ON INTEL., 116TH CONG., REP. ON RUSSIAN ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGNS AND INTER-
FERENCE IN THE 2016 ELECTION (2019), https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/publications/re
port-select-committee-intelligence-united-states-senate-russian-active-measures [https://
perma.cc/U7TV-LUUX].
214 See Saule T. Omarova, New Tech v. New Deal: Fintech as a Systemic Phenomenon, 36
YALE J. ON REG. 735, 790 (2019) (“Potential systemic risk amplifiers, on the other hand,
include the heightened tendency toward herding behavior and procyclicality, greater vulnera-
bility to technical glitches and operational failures, and the rise of the systemic importance of
non-financial firm.”); Gregory Scopino, Preparing Financial Regulation for the Second Ma-
chine Age: The Need for Oversight of Digital Intermediaries in the Futures Markets, 2015
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 439, 446–49 (2015); Hilary J. Allen, Driverless Finance, 10 HARV. BUS.
L. REV. 157, 179 (2020); Van Loo, supra note 198, at 861; Kristin N. Johnson, Regulating R
Innovation: High Frequency Trading in Dark Pools, 42 J. CORP. L. 833, 837 (2017); Tom C.W.
Lin, Artificial Intelligence, Finance, and the Law, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 531, 541–43 (2019);
Yadav, supra note 189, at 1612 (“Algorithmic markets are characterized by a systemic degree R
of “model risk” caused by widespread reliance on stylized models and programming to cap-
ture messy real world behavior.”); Christopher K. Odinet, Securitizing Digital Debts, 52 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 477, 496 (2020) (“[T]he [fintech] securitization process creates a great deal of opac-
ity . . . and that opacity combined with the increasingly complex deep learning underwriting
techniques of fintech lending creates systemic risk concerns.”). See generally Dirk A. Zetz-
sche et al., From Fintech to Techfin: The Regulatory Challenges of Data-Driven Finance, 14
N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 393 (2018).
215 See Allen, supra note 214, at 160 (“[T]he propensity for increased delegation of deci- R
sion-making to a few algorithms may lead to destabilizing correlation that undermines finan-
cial stability [and] increased use of algorithms could undercut existing financial stability
regulation, including regulatory attempts to instill a more stability-oriented financial culture in
financial institutions.”).
216 Andrei A. Kirilenko & Andrew W. Lo, Moore’s Law versus Murphy’s Law: Al-
gorithmic Trading and Its Discontents, 27 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 51, 52 (2013); Pankaj Jain,
et al., Does High-Frequency Trading Increase Systemic Risk?, 31 J. FIN. MKTS. 1, 20–22
(2016).
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in the market more difficult, both for firms and for regulators.217 Correlations
between Big Data strategies might reduce liquidity in times of stress.218 All
of these problems suggest that data-driven markets could be fragile and
volatile.
On the other hand, a number of scholars have argued that the data econ-
omy will lead to more resilient, more stable systems. With respect to demo-
cratic government, data collection and analysis provides an important tool
for states to protect themselves.219 One of the primary efforts in fighting the
coronavirus pandemic was to develop a system for tracking the movements
of citizens in order to contact-trace and reduce the risk of spread of the
virus.220 This was made possible by the widespread use of mobile phones and
the disclosure of location data.221 Similarly, national security agencies rely
on collecting data about emails and website visits in order to prevent terror
attacks and other threats to the nation.222 An entire new field of legal scholar-
ship (sometimes referred to as “RegTech”) is devoted to exploring the ways
in which governments can harness data to improve regulatory structures.223
The underlying thesis of this literature is that more data can lead to better,
more responsive government.
Similarly, a significant body of literature has emerged describing the
ways in which expanded data use in finance can lead to more stable mar-
kets.224 If financial institutions have more data about firms, consumers, and
217 See Allen, supra note 214, at 192 (“Regulators . . . have an important role to play in R
addressing the increasing automation of financial services [but] innovation in financial algo-
rithms will undoubtedly make their jobs more challenging.”).
218 See Allen, supra note 214, at 182–87. R
219 See Sara Binzer Hobolt & Robert Klemmemsen, Responsive Government? Public
Opinion and Government Policy Preferences in Britain and Denmark, 53 POL. STUDIES 379,
391–96 (2005); Julie Freeman & Sharna Quirke, Understanding E-Democracy: Government-
Led Initiatives for Democratic Reform, 5 J. E-DEMOCRACY & OPEN GOV. 141, 149–150
(2013); Marijn Janssen et al., Driving Public Sector Innovation Using Big and Open Linked
Data, 19 INF. SYS. FRONTIERS 189, 192–93 (2017).
220 See Jack Nicas & Daisuke Wakabayashi, Apple and Google Team Up to ‘Contact
Trace’ the Coronavirus, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/10/
technology/apple-google-coronavirus-contact-tracing.html [https://perma.cc/D28Y-HFDL].
221 Byron Tau, Government Tracking How People Move Around in Coronavirus Pan-
demic, WALL ST. J., Mar. 28, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/government-tracking-how-
people-move-around-in-coronavirus-pandemic-11585393202 [https://perma.cc/TT7H-Y26F].
222 See Rajeev Syal, Bulk Data Collection Vital to Prevent Terrorism in UK, Report Finds,
GUARDIAN (Aug. 19, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/19/bulk-data-collec
tion-vital-to-prevent-terrorism-in-uk-report-finds [https://perma.cc/7MTF-VRLD].
223 See Saule T. Omarova, Dealing with Disruption: Emerging Approaches to Fintech
Regulation, 61 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 25, 48–52 (2020); Douglas W. Arner et al., FinTech,
RegTech, and the Reconceptualization of Financial Regulation, 37 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 371,
373 (2017); William Boyd, Environmental Law, Big Data, and the Torrent of Singularities, 64
UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 544, 548 (2016).
224 See Terrence Hendershott et al., Does Algorithmic Trading Improve Liquidity?, 66 J.
FIN. 1, 28–30 (2011); Bjorn Hagstromer & Lars Norden, The Diversity of High-Frequency
Traders, 16 J. FIN. MKTS. 741, 768–69 (2013); Jennifer Conrad et al., High-Frequency Quot-
ing, Trading, and the Efficiency of Prices, 116 J. FIN. ECON. 271, 289–90 (2016); Terrence
Hendershott & Pamela C. Moulton, Automation, Speed, and Stock Market Quality: The NYSE’s
Hybrid, 14 J. FIN. MKTS. 568, 601 (2011).
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trends, they can better allocate their capital to deserving companies.225 This
can reduce the size and length of price asymmetries in markets and thereby
make them better reflect the value of assets.226 Greater data can also lead to
less volatility as new information is constantly reflected in stock prices.227 As
there is more information in the markets, the value of any single piece of
information declines, thereby reducing the likelihood that a news item will
lead to dramatic shifts in the market.228 And as the likelihood of shocks de-
creases, markets should become less prone to crashes and, thus, systemic
risks that reverberate throughout the economy.229 From the regulatory side,
greater data access also means that regulators can identify risks sooner and
more accurately, thereby reducing the chance that a systemically important
financial institution has unknown vulnerabilities.230 This literature thus ar-
gues that the data economy is contributing to greater, not lesser, market
stability.
IV. A UNIFIED LAW OF DATA
The data economy today is driven by data’s unique ability to provide
information with magnitude, permanence, and portability. But these features
have also created sharp debates about the risks and rewards of data. The
debates revolve around three key axes: fairness, efficiency, and stability. As
the last Part demonstrated, along each of these dimensions, there are strong
arguments on either side. Data might be discriminatory, or it might be egali-
tarian. Data might be wasteful, or it might be efficient. Data might be desta-
bilizing, or it might be reinforcing. The dichotomies are stark and often
irreconcilable. Intuitions about the proper use of data tend to depend on
whether we favor the particular result, not on the actual type of data or the
decision whether to collect and store it in the first place. We might be happy
for a company to access our location data to give us better mapping direc-
tions. We would be less happy if they allowed a hacker to steal that data. The
difficulty of fashioning answers to these problems has led data regulation to
be narrowly targeted and circumscribed in scope—a Health Insurance Porta-
bility and Accountability Act to regulate health data, a Financial Services
Modernization Act to regulate financial data, a Federal Information Security
225 See Jennie Bai et al., Have Financial Markets Become More Informative?, 122 J. FIN.
ECON. 625, 62 (2016).
226 See Conrad et al., supra note 224, at 271. R
227 See Hamid Mohtadi & Stefan Ruediger, Does Greater Transparency Reduce Financial
Volatility?, (Working Paper), https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/sites.uwm.edu/dist/0/252/files/
2016/07/does-transparency-reduce-financial-volatility_5_14_2013-1fz624i.pdf [https://
perma.cc/X8DH-HLPS].
228 See Hedi Benamar et al., Demand for Information, Uncertainty, and the Response of
U.S. Treasury Securities to News, (Working Paper, Feb. 19, 2019), https://conference.nber.org/
conf_papers/f117462.pdf [https://perma.cc/H4CW-JGNE].
229 See Magnuson, Regulating Fintech, supra note 198, at 1188–93. R
230 See Omarova, supra note 223, at 48–52; Arner et al., supra note 223, at 371. R
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Management Act to regulate data held by the government—or left to states
to develop in ad hoc and often conflicting legislation—the CCPA, Massa-
chusetts’ Act Relative to Consumer Protection from Security Breaches, and
Maryland’s Online Consumer Protection Act.231
But, as this Part will argue, there is value in creating a more cohesive
set of principles to govern data. Data cannot be easily cabined into industry
or area, and it crosses borders instantaneously. A single piece of data can be
used in a multiplicity of ways, and a unified law of data would bring needed
clarity and uniformity to a tumultuous area of law. It would go a long way
towards ensuring that data is fairer, more efficient, and more stable. This
Part will explore three key principles of what such a unified law might look
like—related to ownership, access, and security—as well as ways in which
these principles might be enshrined to favor particular values over others,
and where flash points of conflict are most likely to arise.232
A. Private Ownership
First and foremost, a unified law of data would need to establish clear
property rights over data.233 The default here would be to grant consumers,
users, and individuals substantial control over any data related to them. A
corollary of this proposition is that data owners would have rights to possess,
control, exclude, and dispose of their data as they see fit. Their location data,
their email data, their phone call data, their health data, and their financial
231 See generally Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996); Financial Services Modernization Act, Pub. L. 106-102, 113
Stat. 1338 (1999); Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-347,
116 Stat. 2899 (2002); California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (“CCPA”), CAL. CIV. CODE
§§ 1798.100-1798.198 (West 2020); An Act Relative to Consumer Protection from Security
Breaches, 2018 Mass. Acts 444; Maryland Online Consumer Protection Act SB0613, 2020
Leg., 441st Sess. (Md. 2020).
232 It should be noted that the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation and
California’s Consumer Privacy Act both come close to being comprehensive regulations of
data and its treatment, at least within their respective jurisdictions. So, the proposal here is not
quite as radical as it might at first glance appear to be. It would, however, mark a sharp
departure from current approaches under U.S. federal law.
233 For analyses of legal status of data ownership rights, see Jeffrey Ritter & Anna Mayer,
Regulating Data as Property: A New Construct for Moving Forward, 16 DUKE L. & TECH.
REV. 220, 223 (2018) (arguing that an “explicit, legal mechanism to establish, claim and trans-
fer property rights in data must be adopted”); Vera Bergelson, It’s Personal but Is It Mine?
Toward Property Rights in Personal Information, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 379, 383 (2003)
(arguing that “in order to protect privacy, individuals must secure control over their personal
information by becoming its real owners”); Stacy-Ann Elvy, Commodifying Consumer Data in
the Era of the Internet of Things, 59 B.C. L. REV. 423, 463 (2018) (noting that
“[c]ommentators have adopted contrasting positions on questions of data ownership, rights in
data and the legal regimes that should govern related issues”); Nancy S. Kim, Contract’s Ad-
aptation and the Online Bargain, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1327, 1356 (2011) (“It is unclear what
legal right or interest, if any, consumers have in their personal information.”); Andreas Boerd-
ing et al., Data Ownership: A Property Rights Approach from a European Perspective, 11 J.
CIV. L. STUD. 323, 325 (2018).
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data would all be owned by the individuals themselves. They could keep it
or sell it when and how they wanted.
This might seem like an obvious point that could not be seriously de-
bated. But in fact, ownership rights over data are both legally ambiguous and
deeply contentious.234 In a well-publicized case against the file sharing site
Megaupload, the U.S. government argued that users who had stored data on
the cloud did not retain ownership over the data uploaded.235 The Brookings
Institution issued a report in 2019 arguing that individuals do not, and
should not, have property rights over data, even if it is related to their per-
sonal lives.236 Indeed, the issue is so unclear that in 2019, Senator John Ken-
nedy introduced a bill, the Own Your Own Data Act, that would have
provided that “each individual owns and has an exclusive property right in
the data that individual generates on the internet.”237 The bill has not passed.
Defining just what counts as personal data worthy of property recogni-
tion would, of course, be a crucial element of the right. After all, data is
simply information, and thus raises a number of issues not presented by, say,
property rights in a house or a car. Some areas would be easy. Data owner-
ship rights would clearly extend to medical records, meaning that patients
would own their X-rays and vaccination histories and could take them with
them wherever they go. Data ownership rights would also extend to location
data, meaning that cellphone users could access and transfer records of
where they have been.  Ownership rights would apply to bank records, as
well, meaning that consumers could store and share information about where
and how they have spent money. But other areas are harder. Does the recipi-
ent or the sender own the data in an email message, or do they both? If a
borrower defaults on a mortgage, does the bank own the data related to that
fact, or does the borrower? If a shop has a security camera that records
customers who enter, who owns the data on the camera? These are difficult
problems, and their seriousness should not be minimized. At the same time,
there are ways to deal with them. The GDPR, for example, starts with a
broad right (all “personal data” must be processed lawfully and fairly) and
234 In the healthcare space, see, e.g., Barbara J. Evans, Would Patient Ownership of Health
Data Improve Confidentiality?, 14 AM. MED. ASS’N J. ETHICS 724, 728 (2012); I. Glenn Co-
hen, Is There a Duty to Share Healthcare Data?, in BIG DATA, HEALTH LAW, & BIOETHICS
209 (I. Glenn Cohen et al., eds., 2018).
235 Brief of the United States Regarding the Breadth and Format of a Hearing to Determine
the Applicability of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g), United States v. Kim, No.
1:12–cr–3, 2012 WL 5474807 (E.D.Va. 2012).
236 See Cameron F. Kerry & John B. Morris, Why Data Ownership Is the Wrong Approach
to Protecting Privacy, BROOKINGS INST. (June 26, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/
techtank/2019/06/26/why-data-ownership-is-the-wrong-approach-to-protecting-privacy/
[https://perma.cc/FT44-Q9WD].
237 Own Your Own Data Act, S. 806, 116th Cong. § 2(a) (2019); see Daniel R. Stoller,
Lawmakers Question Need for Data Ownership at Senate Hearing, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 24,
2019, 3:36 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/privacy-and-data-security/lawmakers-ques
tion-need-for-data-ownership-at-senate-hearing [https://perma.cc/WHX2-ZFKY].
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then proceeds to delineate a lengthy series of exceptions to the right.238 A
similar approach could be used in developing data ownership rights.
One of the advantages of a data ownership model of data regulation is
that it creates room for individuals to make their own decisions about the
tradeoffs of privacy, convenience, and other values. Rather than imposing a
single regime about when and where firms can use consumer data, data own-
ership would allow more individualized results. One of the dangers of cur-
rent regulations of data privacy, for example, is that they tend to create
barriers even to consensual data sharing practices. It is remarkably complex
for consumers to share a comprehensive picture of their health data, requir-
ing them to go to numerous health care providers, fill out duplicative author-
ization forms, and pay large fees.239 The process is so complex that more
than seventy percent of Americans have not seen even a single health record
in the last year.240 Similarly, the European Union’s regulations about strong
customer authentication for banks have raised the barriers that consumers
must overcome in order to share their financial data.241 A data ownership
regime would help reduce these sorts of costly overweighting problems by
giving individuals the right to decide for themselves how to use, store, and
share their data.
One important point of tension in a data ownership regime would sur-
round the question of consent. Property rights are premised on the ability of
owners to do as they wish with their property, and thus, we must delve into
their intent when deciding proper legal outcomes. But, of course, consent is
tricky on the internet. Companies might, for example, attempt to skirt around
data ownership rights by simply including a provision in their terms and
conditions forcing owners to waive their rights. Take, for example, the cur-
rent terms and conditions in Apple’s iCloud service for storing data (which,
to be clear, is far from an extreme example).242 Section V.H.1 of the terms
and conditions provides that, by submitting or posting content on areas of
iCloud that are accessible to the public or other users, users “grant Apple a
238 The GDPR defines “personal data” to mean “‘any information relating to an identified
or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be
identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an
identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to
the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural
person.” Regulation (EU) 2016/679, of the European Parliament and the Council of 27 April
2016 on the protection of natural persons with regards to the processing of personal data and
on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection
Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 at arts. (4)(1), (5)(1)(a), 6(1).
239 See Harlan Krumholz, It’s Your Right to See Your Medical Records. It Shouldn’t Be
This Hard to Do, NPR (Aug. 28, 2019, 5:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/
2019/08/28/754725843/opinion-its-your-right-to-see-your-medical-records-it-shouldn-t-be-
this-hard-to- [https://perma.cc/8ZTC-STJD].
240 See PICNIC HEALTH, DATA OWNERSHIP, https://picnichealth.com/data-ownership
[https://perma.cc/69JR-P6TH].
241 See Council Directive 2015/2366, art. 4(30), 2015 O.J. (L 337/35).
242 iCloud Terms and Conditions, Section V.H.1, https://www.apple.com/legal/internet-
services/icloud/en/terms.html [https://perma.cc/V8AY-2Q4J].
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worldwide, royalty-free, non-exclusive license to use, distribute, reproduce,
modify, adapt, publish, translate, publicly perform and publicly display such
Content on the Service solely for the purpose for which such Content was
submitted or made available, without any compensation or obligation to
you.”243 The somewhat confusing provision appears to suggest that if you
upload a photo to the cloud and share it with others, Apple could publicly
display it, or even Photoshop it, so long as Apple had the same general
purpose as the user initially had. It should be noted that Apple expressly
disclaims ownership of information stored on its servers, but such a claim
could potentially be made by other companies and might well defeat the
purpose of establishing data ownership rights in the first place. Given the
problems inherent in online contracting—including whether people actually
read terms and conditions—default rules requiring strong consent proce-
dures for the transfer of data ownership must be established.
B. Public Access
Strong private data ownership rights, however, must be paired with
equally strong public access rights. A type of eminent domain for data would
give governmental entities the right to collect, access, and use data—even
privately held data—so long as they have legitimate purposes for doing so.
Government data access could help promote essential societal goals, such as
responding to healthcare crises, preventing crime and terrorism, and stabiliz-
ing financial markets.
Again, public access rights might appear to be a basic and incontrovert-
ible proposition—how could government not have the right to access the
data it needs for its functions? But again, the question is contentious and
legally ambiguous. In a well-publicized case in 2019, Apple refused to pro-
vide assistance to government efforts to unlock the iPhone of a gunman who
had attacked the Pensacola Naval Air Station and who law enforcement
agents believed had connections with Al Qaeda.244 Apple argued that creat-
ing a backdoor for law enforcement agencies would cripple the company’s
cybersecurity mechanisms and open up avenues for other, less well-inten-
tioned actors to exploit.245 Similarly, during the coronavirus pandemic, the
federal government was forced to rely on mobile advertising companies to
gain access to location data of citizens to track the spread of the virus, after
243 Id.
244 See Chris Welch, The FBI Successfully Broke Into a Gunman’s iPhone, But It’s Still
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uncertainties arose about whether they could access the data directly from
cellphone companies.246
But a thriving data economy that is impervious to government scrutiny
is a problem. While claims about the dangers of granting backdoors into data
storage systems are valid and important, they should not overcome the basic
fact that individuals store more and more of their information on such sys-
tems. To prevent governments from accessing that data for their operations
would be to deprive them of the most important tool they have to promote
the public good. Governments should have a right to access data. And as a
corollary, companies should have an obligation to give governments the
tools to do so.
This does not mean that the power of eminent domain over data would
be unlimited. Even if governments have the right and the ability to access
data created and stored by private entities for legitimate reasons, the scope of
this right would need to be conscribed by prudential principles, particularly
transparency and reviewability. In recent years, a drumbeat of discoveries
have highlighted the extent of government data collection, and, in particular,
the access that police departments can gain to private data.247 In 2019, Ama-
zon disclosed that video footage from Ring doorbell cameras could be
downloaded and stored by police departments, potentially forever, and that
police departments could share the footage with others.248 Police departments
can also access audio recordings captured by Amazon’s virtual assistant de-
vice Alexa.249 Police officers have also received warrants to search consumer
DNA sites for genetic profiles to solve crimes.250 In order to reduce the risk
of abuse, these programs must be transparent to citizens and reviewable by
the judiciary.
C. Security
A final principle of a unified law of data would be that possessors of
data must protect it with adequate cybersecurity measures. Of course, saying
that companies should prevent hacks is a bit like saying that people should
be healthy: it’s a fine idea, but devilishly difficult to accomplish. At the same
246 See Byron Tau, Government Tracking How People Move Around in Coronavirus Pan-
demic, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 28, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/government-tracking-how-
people-move-around-in-coronavirus-pandemic-11585393202 [https://perma.cc/XGY7-
M3HC].
247 See Jack Goldsmith & Andrew Keane Woods, Internet Speech Will Never Go Back to
Normal, ATLANTIC (Apr. 25, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/04/what-
covid-revealed-about-internet/610549/ [https://perma.cc/9UHU-KU4B].
248 See Harwell, supra note 70. R
249 See Jon Fingas, Florida Police Obtain Alexa Recordings in Murder Investigation, EN-
GADGET (Nov. 2, 2019), https://www.engadget.com/2019-11-02-florida-police-obtain-alexa-re
cordings-in-murder-case.html [https://perma.cc/Q72R-JYQZ].
250 See Kashmir Hill & Heather Murphy, Your DNA Profile is Private? A Florida Judge
Just Said Otherwise, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/05/busi
ness/dna-database-search-warrant.html [https://perma.cc/5PXK-8VHY].
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time, regulation can play an important role in improving cybersecurity prac-
tices, both through ex ante monitoring structures and ex post liability
requirements.
First and foremost, data regulations must set out clear, specific, and
affirmative obligations on possessors of data to protect it from unauthorized
access. Data security rules would need to establish the basic obligation of
cybersecurity (which is currently shoehorned in through a variety of dispa-
rate rules and regulations), but they should also go further. Companies
should be required to establish not just “reasonable” cybersecurity proce-
dures, but “best-in-class” procedures.251 Too often, cybersecurity procedures
at companies amount to little more than “check-the-box” exercises.252 Regu-
lators could issue rules specifically setting out the particular tools and mech-
anisms that companies in particular industries needed to adopt.253 And
furthermore, regulators should increasingly offer “cyberhygiene” scans, in
which experts review companies’ cybersecurity mechanisms to detect flaws
or vulnerabilities.254
Second, there need to be strong and broad liability rules requiring pos-
sessors of data to compensate individuals if their data is hacked. Too often,
possessors of data can deflect or delay liability by arguing that someone else
was at fault or that the consumer cannot prove damages or even that the
consumer lacks standing to bring a claim in the first place.255 Instead of plac-
ing the burden on consumers to identify the methods used by the hacker or
the precise harms generated to them, data regulation should establish a clear
rule that possessors of data must compensate consumers when hackers have
251 See NAT’L CONF. STATE LEG., DATA SECURITY LAWS—PRIVATE SECTOR (2019),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/data-security-
laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/RQQ6-AJPQ] (noting that most state data security laws “require
businesses that own, license, or maintain personal information about a resident of that state to
implement and maintain ‘reasonable security procedures and practices’ appropriate to the na-
ture of the information and to protect the personal information from unauthorized access, de-
struction, use, modification, or disclosure”); Jeff Kosseff, Congress Is Finally Tackling
Privacy! Now Let’s Do Cybersecurity, SLATE (Dec. 3, 2019, 3:00 PM), https://slate.com/tech
nology/2019/12/congress-national-privacy-law-cybersecurity.html [https://perma.cc/E9VH-
8C4Z].
252 See Roger A. Grimes, 2 Critical Ways Regulations and Frameworks Weaken Cyber-
security, CSO (Jan. 10, 2019, 3:00 AM), https://www.csoonline.com/article/3332139/2-critical
-ways-regulations-and-frameworks-weaken-cybersecurity.html [https://perma.cc/DWF8-
XCPE].
253 New York, for example, has an extensive list of specific cybersecurity procedures that
financial institutions must abide by. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 500 (2017).
254 See Michael Wines, Wary of Hackers, States Move to Upgrade Voting Systems, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/14/us/voting-russians-hacking-
states-.html [https://perma.cc/GC33-ULSM].
255 See generally Seth D. Rothman & Dennis S. Klein, Defending a Data Breach Class
Action, 255 N.Y.L.J. S6 (Jun. 6, 2016), https://www.hugheshubbard.com/news/defending-a-
data-breach-class-action [https://perma.cc/CBH8-66G6]. See also Jon R. Knight, The New
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gained access to their data. If it turns out that a third-party vendor or other
party is at fault, then the primary data possessor should have the right to
receive indemnification from those parties ex post. Such broad liability rules
would help incentivize companies to devote greater resources to cyber-
security and help compensate victims in a speedy and efficient way. They
would also provide an efficient way to force companies that profit from stor-
ing data to “internalize” the cost of breaches. To the extent that such rules
would make data collection and storage more costly, this would merely cor-
rect for the current deflated costs companies expend while externalizing the
risk to others.
These rules would also need to be mandatory and non-waivable in order
to prevent companies from contracting around them. To return to Apple’s
iCloud service, the terms and conditions provide the following with regard
to hacking and cybersecurity:
• “You are solely responsible for maintaining the confidentiality and secur-
ity of your Account and for all activities that occur on or through your
Account . . . . Provided we have exercised reasonable skill and due care,
Apple shall not be responsible for any losses arising out of the unautho-
rized use of your Account resulting from you not following these
rules.”256
• “Apple does not represent or guarantee that the service will be free from
loss, corruption, attack, viruses, interference, hacking, or other security
intrusion, and Apple disclaims any liability relating thereto.”257
• “You expressly understand and agree that Apple . . . shall not be liable to
you for any direct, indirect, incidental, special, consequential or exem-
plary damages, including, but not limited to, damages for loss of profits,
goodwill, use, data, cost of procurement of substitute goods or services, or
other intangible losses (even if Apple has been advised of the possibility
of such damages), resulting from: (i) the use or inability to use the service
. . . (iii) the unauthorized access to or alteration of your transmissions or
data; . . . and (vi) any other matter relating to the service.”258
• “You agree to comply with this Agreement and to defend, indemnify and
hold harmless Apple from and against any and all claims and demands
arising from usage of your Account, whether or not such usage is ex-
pressly authorized by you.”259
These sorts of broad waivers might well deter consumers from bringing even
valid claims related to hacks, and, if broadly adopted, could defeat the essen-
tial purpose of cybersecurity rules. Instead, a unified data regulation must
clarify that data possessors have non-waivable obligations to establish best-
256 See iCloud Terms and Conditions, supra note 242. R
257 Id. at Section IX.
258 Id.
259 Id.
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in-class cybersecurity procedures and to compensate users for breaches
when they happen.
V. CONCLUSION
The explosion of the data economy has raised a host of thorny legal,
political, and social problems. Some of these are related to data’s drawbacks,
some are related to its opportunities, and many are somewhere in between.
This Article has attempted to provide a unified treatment of the field, high-
lighting both areas of agreement and disagreement. It has also attempted to
sketch out principles that should apply broadly to the industry as a whole.
Too often, the conversations about the future of data take place in isolation
and without dialogue. It is hoped that this Article will bring some unity to
the field.
